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The extensive public support measures for the 
ﬁ  nancial sector have been key for the management 
of the current ﬁ  nancial crisis. This paper gives 
a detailed description of the measures taken by 
central banks and governments and attempts 
a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness 
of such measures. The geographical focus of 
the paper is on the European Union (EU) and 
the United States. The crisis response in both 
regions has been largely similar in terms of 
both tools and scope, and monetary policy 
actions and bank rescue measures have become 
increasingly intertwined. However, there are 
important differences, not only between the EU 
and the United States (e.g. with regard to the 
involvement of the central bank), but also within 
the EU (e.g. asset relief schemes).
JEL Classiﬁ  cation Numbers: E58, E61, G21, G38
Keywords: bank rescue measures, public crisis 
management.6
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SUMMARY
The ﬁ  nancial crisis has become a key challenge 
for policy-makers. The support of banks is seen 
as paramount for restoring the stability of the 
ﬁ  nancial system and for maintaining lending to 
the real economy. Hence, an assessment of what 
has been done to contain the crisis is warranted. 
This paper provides a systematic overview 
and a preliminary assessment of the measures 
adopted by governments and central banks. In 
geographical terms, the review is primarily 
focused on the EU and the United States, where 
support measures have been most prevalent.
Overall, the crisis responses in the United States 
have been broadly similar to those in the EU. 
First, they have employed broadly the same tools 
(government guarantees, capital and liquidity 
injections, and asset protection). Second, apart 
from their scope, they have also been similar in 
size. Like the EU, the United States has relied 
on a mix of ad hoc measures for individual 
institutions and schemes addressing the wider 
needs of the ﬁ  nancial system. Also, monetary 
policy actions and bank rescue measures have 
become increasingly intertwined. 
However, there are also important differences 
between the support measures in the United States 
and the EU. For example, the Federal Reserve 
System has been more expansive and has also 
targeted individual ﬁ  nancial intermediaries; the 
Eurosystem’s actions, however, have been limited 
to liquidity extension. A further key difference 
has been the sizable repayments of capital by US 
banks. This may be partly attributed to the fact 
that capital injections were a requirement in the 
United States, while in Europe capital support 
has typically been voluntary.
Also, sizable differences in crisis responses have 
emerged within the EU. These differences partly 
reﬂ  ect the magnitude of the problems faced by 
banking systems, the degree to which banking 
systems are exposed to bad assets and potential 
budgetary restrictions, which impose constraints 
on making commitments by governments. More 
speciﬁ  cally, a number of EU countries have set 
up schemes to address the problems in their 
ﬁ  nancial system, while many others have relied 
on ad hoc measures for individual institutions. 
Given the wide range of approaches in the EU, 
the United States naturally lies somewhere 
between the extremes. 7
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1   INTRODUCTION
1 INTRODUCTION
In the course of the current global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, various authors have deliberated on its 
possible causes (see, for example, 
Blanchard, 2008; Gorton, 2008). One aspect that 
has until now hardly been assessed is crisis 
management, and in particular the support 
measures adopted by public authorities during 
the crisis. This paper aims to ﬁ  ll this void by 
providing a systematic overview and a 
preliminary assessment of the measures adopted 
by governments and central banks.1 The ﬁ  nancial 
crisis has been a key challenge for policy-
makers. The support of banks is seen as 
paramount for restoring stability of the ﬁ  nancial 
system and for maintaining lending to the real 
economy. Hence, an assessment of what has 
been done to contain the crisis is warranted.
The objective of this paper is, therefore, to 
review the support measures adopted by 
categorising and describing them and to provide 
some initial considerations on their effectiveness. 
The geographical scope of the review is 
primarily focused on the EU and the United 
States, where support measures have been 
most prevalent. The structure of the remainder 
of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂ  y 
sketches the main events of the current ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, to set the stage for the description and 
assessment of the public support measures. 
Section 3 gives a detailed description of the 
support measures employed (including the 
amounts extended and committed), ranging 
from provisions of liquidity by central banks 
to deposit insurance enhancements, guarantee 
schemes, recapitalisation measures and 
asset protection schemes. Section 4 offers a 
preliminary assessment of the effectiveness 
of the measures, while Section 5 concludes 
by comparing the measures adopted in the EU 
A recent publication by the BIS also addresses this issue, but  1 
the present paper focuses on a larger sample of countries and, 
in addition to government measures, also covers those adopted 
by central banks (Bank for International Settlements, 2009).
“… In mid-October [2008], an aggressive international response was required to avert a global 
banking meltdown …”
Ben Bernanke, Fed Chairman, testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, 25 June 2009.
“… This is the paradox of policy at present – almost any policy measure that is desirable now 
appears diametrically opposite to the direction in which we need to go in the long term… ”
Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, Confederation of British Industry (CBI) Dinner, 
Nottingham, 20 January 2009.
“… We have […] used an exceptional set of non-standard policy tools. These tools, combined with 
the bold action taken by euro area governments over recent months, have played an essential role 
in preventing a collapse of the ﬁ  nancial system and in bolstering conﬁ  dence… ”
Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), ceremony conferring the 
honorary title of Doctor Honoris Causa at the University of National and World Economy, Soﬁ  a, 
12 June 2009.
“… We tell the savers that their deposits are safe… ”
Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, announcing a blanket guarantee for private deposits during a 
press conference, Berlin, 5 October 2008.8
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and in the United States and brieﬂ  y outlining 
further issues. An appendix gives a detailed 
overview of the support measures taken by the 
US Administration (Treasury, Federal Reserve 
System, and FDIC), thereby reﬂ  ecting  the 
prominence of the TARP.9
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2   THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 2  THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Originating in the US mortgage market, the 
ﬁ   nancial crisis rapidly spread through the 
ﬁ   nancial sector and spilled over to other 
industrialised and emerging market economies. 
Central banks became the ﬁ  rst line of defence, 
responding to the emerging crisis through the 
injection of liquidity into the ﬁ  nancial system. 
When it became evident that the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis was driven by concerns over solvency, 
rather than liquidity, which threatened the 
stability of the ﬁ  nancial system, governments 
resorted to traditional rescue measures directed 
at individual institutions. These early support 
measures for individual banks consisted of lines 
of liquidity to failing institutions, which were 
often subsequently sold and merged with an 
allegedly stronger partner.2
Despite these initial support measures, in Autumn 
2008 the ﬁ   nancial system was faced with an 
abyss, when Lehman Brothers collapsed 
on 15 September. The bankruptcy was partly 
instigated by the takeover of the 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which had been 
taken into conservatorship by the US Treasury on 
7 September. The GSEs are an integral part of the 
mortgage market and their takeover made market 
sentiment extremely nervous with regard to 
mortgage exposures. Their takeover, combined 
with the concern over the possible collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, led to the sale of Merrill Lynch 
to Bank of America. The collapse of Lehman 
Brothers subsequently sent a shock wave through 
the global ﬁ  nancial system, which was largely 
attributable to Lehman Brothers’ importance as a 
counterparty in the credit derivative market. 
On 16 September, the Federal Reserve System 
averted the failure of American International 
Group (AIG) with the extension of a 
USD 85 billion loan, and on 25 September, 
Washington Mutual was seized by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and partly 
sold to JP Morgan Chase. Later that month, 
Wachovia faced intense liquidity pressures, 
which threatened its viability and ﬁ  nally resulted 
in its acquisition by Wells Fargo. “In short, the 
period was one of extraordinary risk for the 
ﬁ  nancial system and the global economy.”3
The repercussions of the Lehman Brothers 
collapse crossed the Atlantic. Losses on 
exposures to Lehman Brothers showed up in 
the balance sheets of banks around the globe. 
In Europe, the crisis gained new momentum 
when several large banks received substantial 
government support and some institutions were 
even broken up (e.g. Fortis).
While risk aversion and mistrust between 
ﬁ  nancial players led to the drying up of funding 
markets, concern over the solvency of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions was now severely affecting the 
conﬁ   dence of depositors and revealed the 
weaknesses of deposit insurance schemes. 
Hence, in October 2009, governments around 
the world stepped in and adopted a series of 
extraordinary measures, which would have been 
unimaginable only months previously. Many 
countries increased the coverage of their deposit 
insurance schemes and moved away from 
co-insurance. They guaranteed newly issued 
bank bonds or announced blanket guarantees 
for all bank liabilities. They injected capital, in 
some cases to such an extent that they actually 
became the majority owners or squeezed out 
shareholders. They ring-fenced, swapped and 
transferred toxic assets, extended non-recourse 
loans and replaced private investors in illiquid 
markets. Governments pursued this policy partly 
through ad hoc measures, but increasingly by 
implementing explicit schemes, the US Troubled 
Assets Relief Program (TARP) being the largest 
(USD 700 billion) and most prominent.
Examples of banks which fall into this category are IKB (which  2 
received liquidity guarantees and recapitalisation from KfW and 
a group of private banks and was eventually sold to LoneStar) 
and SachsenLB (which received a liquidity line from Sachsen 
in August 2007 and was eventually merged with LBBW in 
April 2008) in Germany, Northern Rock (nationalised in February 
2008) and Bradford and Bingley (nationalised in September 2008 
and partly sold to Abbey (Santander)) in the UK and Bear Stearns 
(sold in March 2008 to JPMorgan Chase) in the United States.
Ben Bernanke, Fed Chairman, testimony before the Committee  3 
on Oversight and Government Reform, 25 June 200910
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3  DISCUSSION OF SUPPORT MEASURES
This section discusses the various types of 
measures used during the crisis. Each sub-section
considers a different type of measure. It should 
be noted that these measures to support banks 
have typically been used in combination. 
By way of example, Box 1 shows how these 
measures were combined in the case of the ING 
rescue. However, the actual use of measures 
has generally followed an observable sequence, 
whereby support has been provided to banks 
on the liabilities side before the assets side of 
their balance sheets has been relieved. Hoggart 
and Reidhill (2003) argue that this is in line 
with the immediate objective of the authorities 
of restoring public conﬁ  dence in order to avoid 
bank runs. Furthermore, governments had 
recourse to ad hoc measures for individual 
banks when the crisis erupted, but shifted to 
setting up system-wide schemes, as the crisis 
persisted and intensiﬁ  ed. In this section, we ﬁ  rst 
review central bank actions, before going on to 
consider government measures.
Box 1
THE ING RESCUE PACKAGE
The rescue package for ING comprised recapitalisations, government guarantees and asset relief 
measures. In sum, ING received €10 billion in capital, €17 billion in government-guaranteed 
bonds and asset guarantees on an Alt-A portfolio of €27 billion, of which the government-
guaranteed 80%, i.e. €21 billion.
Capital injections
In October 2008 the Dutch State purchased €10 billion worth of subordinated bonds to bolster 
the bank’s Tier 1 capital. The bonds had an issue price of €10, based on the closing share price 
on 16 October, and pay non-cumulative coupons linked to the dividends on ordinary shares.1 
The rate of return is ﬁ  xed at an annual coupon of 8.5%, but rises if the dividends on ordinary 
shares exceed 8.5% (110% of dividends in 2009, 120% in 2010 and 125% in 2011). The link to 
dividends on ordinary shares and the step-up provides an incentive to repay taxpayers money 
and thus represents a viable exit strategy. Exit of the government is further facilitated by a call 
option on the bonds, whereby ING is entitled to buy back the bonds at any time for 150% of the 
issue price. ING also has the option to convert the bonds into ordinary shares after three years. 
If conversion is chosen, ING can repurchase the shares at the issue price, which serves to protect 
taxpayers’ money. All coupon payments need to be approved by De Nederlandsche Bank. 
Shareholders rights are not diluted and the government does not obtain any voting rights, although 
it has the right to appoint two out of twelve supervisory Board Members. In December 2009, 
ING made use of an early repayment option to repurchase €5 billion of core Tier 1 securities 
at the issue price. In addition, ING paid €259 million for accrued coupons and a premium of 
€346 million. The repayment was ﬁ  nanced through a €7.5 billion rights issue.
Asset support
On 26 January 2009, a back-up facility was granted to ING, in relation to its Alt-A securitised 
mortgage portfolio. The government agreed to share 80% of losses and proﬁ  ts on a portfolio of 
€26.77 billion. The value of the portfolio had previously been written down from USD 39 billion to 
1  The share price of ING dropped by 27% on 17 October 2008, and thus 16 October was chosen as the basis for the issue price.11
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3   DISCUSSION OF 
SUPPORT MEASURES
3.1  CENTRAL BANK MEASURES
Early on in the crisis, it became clear that 
the provision of central bank liquidity was 
paramount to support banks when liquidity 
in the market dried up. A primary reason for 
the freeze in the money market was a lack of 
conﬁ  dence, owing to the uncertainty regarding 
banks’ exposure to subprime assets and 
structured products, and the perceived rise in 
counterparty risk (see Committee on the Global 
Financial System, 2008). As a reﬂ  ection  of 
this lack of conﬁ   dence, the spreads between 
the three-month deposit and overnight swap 
rates, which were already at elevated levels, 
soared during September 2008 (see European 
Central Bank, 2008).
Central banks had already lowered their policy 
rates as the substantial and rapid deterioration in 
the  ﬁ   nancial market conditions and the 
macroeconomic environment had changed the 
outlook for price stability, with inﬂ  ation risks 
declining and deﬂ  ation risks emerging both in 
the euro area as well as globally. In response to 
the intensiﬁ   cation of the crisis, central banks 
additionally adopted various measures to 
enhance liquidity provision to banks, which can 
be broadly divided into traditional and 
nonstandard categories.4 At the onset of the 
crisis, the measures adopted consisted of 
traditional market operations, outside the 
regular schedule or of larger amounts, to keep 
short-term money-market rates close to policy 
rates (see Committee on the Global Financial 
System, 2008).5
When these measures proved insufﬁ  cient  to 
reduce funding pressures and the widening 
spread between overnight and term interbank 
lending rates, central banks implemented 
changes to their operational framework. These 
changes included, inter alia, more frequent 
auctions, an expansion of the volume of lending 
facilities, longer-term ﬁ  nancing, changes in the 
auctioning process, a broadening of the range 
The distinction between standard and non-standard measures  4 
varies across central banks owing to different traditions, 
frameworks and ﬁ  nancial system structures.
For example, the ECB started to conduct supplementary  5 
liquidity-providing longer-term reﬁ  nancing  operations 
on 12 September 2007 with the objective to support the 
normalisation of the euro money market. See http://www.ecb.int/
press/pr/date/2007/html/pr070906_1.en.html.
USD 35.1 billion (equivalent to €26.77 billion). ING pays the Government a fee for the guarantee, 
while the government pays ING a management and funding fee. However, ING remains the legal 
owner of the portfolio. Accordingly, ING’s risk-weighted assets were reduced by €15 billion, 
increasing ING’s core Tier 1 ratio by 32 basis points to 7.4%. The annual guarantee fee consists 
of a ﬁ  xed amount plus a percentage of the payments received on the securities.
Government-guaranteed bonds
In addition, ING obtained €17 billion of government bond guarantees. The bonds are mainly 
denominated in USD. Their maturity at issuance is between 1.5 and 5 years. About €9 billion 
of the bonds will mature in February 2012.
Restructuring
As a consequence of the substantial government support received, ING is among the banks 
required to undergo a restructuring procedure enforced by the European Commission (see Box 3). 
The restructuring involves the break-up of ING, which will have to sell off its insurance and 
investment management business. Compared with before the bailout, ING’s balance sheet will 
shrink considerably.12
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of accepted collateral, outright asset purchases 
and the setting up of liquidity facilities for 
intermediaries other than banks.6
In addition, the large central banks coordinated 
some of their actions.7 This cooperation was 
reﬂ  ected in the joint announcement to provide 
term funding and to enter into temporary swap 
agreements to obtain foreign currency liquidity, 
which they passed on to the ﬁ  nancial sector.8 
In the following sub-section, the non-standard 
measures taken by the Eurosystem, the Federal 
Reserve System and the Bank of England are 
described in more detail.
3.1.1 THE EUROSYSTEM 9
While it was sufﬁ  cient to adjust the operational 
framework in the ﬁ  rst year of the crisis (i.e. with 
more frequent ﬁ   ne-tuning operations and 
supplementary longer-term reﬁ  nancing 
operations with maturities of three months, 
and subsequently also six months), 
the Eurosystem decided to adopt non-standard 
measures in response to the intensiﬁ  cation of the 
crisis after Lehman Brothers collapsed. Hence, 
in October 2008 the Eurosystem  changed the 
procedures for the implementation of monetary 
policy by carrying out its main reﬁ  nancing 
operations through a ﬁ   xed-rate full allotment 
tender procedure (see European 
Central Bank, 2009). In addition, the Eurosystem 
temporarily reduced the corridor of the standing 
facilities to 100 basis points until January 2009. 
In the light of repeated liquidity imbalances, the 
Eurosystem also pursued numerous ﬁ  ne tuning 
operations in the form of variable tenders. In 
June 2009, the ECB held a one-year loan 
auction allotting a total volume of €442 billion. 
Another two one-year loan auctions were carried 
out in September and December 2009. Starting 
in July 2009, the ECB targeted speciﬁ  c securities 
markets through the purchase of covered bonds, 
with a total volume of up to €60 billion.10 This 
outright purchase of securities is a novelty for 
the Eurosystem. Since July 2009, the Eurosystem 
has been continuously buying covered bonds, 
with a cumulated nominal amount of €60 billion 
at the end of June 2010, when the programme 
was closed. Due to new strains in certain market 
segments caused by ﬁ  scal difﬁ  culties in some 
The ECB widened its pool of eligible collateral to include  6 
marketable and non-marketable securities with a rating of at 
least “BBB-”, but applied additional credit-risk haircuts to debt 
securities with a rating below “A-”. See http://www.ecb.europa.
eu/ecb/legal/pdf/l_31420081125en00140015.pdf.
Since the coordinated actions taken in December 2007, the G-10  7 
central banks have continued to work together closely and to 
consult regularly on liquidity pressures in funding markets.
For instance, in December 2007 the ECB launched (in cooperation  8 
with the Federal Reserve System and other major central banks) 
US dollar liquidity providing operations, against collateral 
eligible for Eurosystem credit operations, in connection with 
the Federal Reserve System’s US dollar Term Auction Facility. 
The Federal Reserve System provided the US dollars to the ECB 
by means of a temporary swap line, and the Eurosystem passed 
on these US dollars to its counterparties in repo operations. 
In addition, on 15 October 2008 the ECB and the Swiss National 
Bank jointly announced that they would start providing Swiss 
Franc liquidity to their counterparties via EUR/CHF foreign 
exchange swap operations. On 10 May 2010, the ECB announced 
to reactivate the temporary US Dollar liquidity swap lines 
with the Federal Reserve which started on the following day. 
The liquidity swap lines with the Fed and the Swiss National 
Bank had been discontinued in January 2010.
More details on the implementation of monetary policy by the  9 
Eurosystem in response to the ﬁ  nancial market tensions can be 
found in the article entitled “The implementation of monetary 
policy since August 2007” in the July 2009 issue of the ECB’s 
Monthly Bulletin.
For further details see http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2009/ 10 
html/pr090604_1.en.html.
Chart 1 Securities held by the Eurosystem 
















July Sep. Nov. Jan. Mar. May
2009 2010
covered bond purchase programme
securities markets programme
Source: ECB.
Note: Chart gives the volumes of bonds bought under the 
Covered Bond Purchase Programme and from May 2010 also 
under the Securities Markets Programme.13
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3   DISCUSSION OF 
SUPPORT MEASURES Euro area countries, the ECB intervened in the 
euro area public and private debt securities 
markets through the Securities Markets 
Programme, conducted further ﬁ   xed rate full 
allotment tenders and reactivated the temporary 
US Dollar liquidity swap lines with the Federal 
Reserve, which had been stopped in 
February 2010.
Many euro area governments implemented 
additional measures, facilitating banks’ access 
to ECB funding. In several countries, banks 
swapped assets for government bonds that were 
eligible as collateral in the Eurosystem’s main 
reﬁ   nancing operations and standing facilities 
(e.g. Greece). For such temporary swaps, banks 
were generally charged a fee. In addition, most 
countries granted guarantees for banks’ new 
bond issues (Section 3.2.2). Banks could pledge 
these government-guaranteed bonds as collateral 
to obtain Eurosystem liquidity.
3.1.2 THE BANK OF ENGLAND
In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England 
(BoE) has also adopted a range of non-standard 
measures. To alleviate strains in longer-maturity 
money markets, on 19 September 2007 the BoE 
introduced term auctions that provided funds at 
a three-month maturity against a wider range of 
collateral, including mortgage collateral, than at 
its weekly open market operations.
In January 2009 the BoE set up an Asset 
Purchase Facility (APF) to buy up to 
GBP 250 billion of high-quality assets.11 
GBP 50 billion may be purchased ﬁ  nance by the 
issue of Treasury bills and the Debt Management 
Ofﬁ   ce’s cash management operations, 
and GBP 200 billion were to be purchased by 
the creating of central bank reserves. The aim of 
the facility was to improve liquidity in credit 
markets by buying UK government securities 
(gilts), commercial paper and corporate bonds. 
An indemnity was provided by the government 
to cover any losses arising from the facility. 
Via the APF and through the creation of central 
bank reserves, the BoE bought GBP 200 billion 
of assets and decided in February 2010 to 
maintain this stock of asset purchases. More 
than 99 percent of the assets purchased were 
UK government securities (gilts), the remainder 
being corporate bonds. The BoE did not buy 
commercial paper.12 The APF continues to 
operate its facilities for commercial paper and 
corporate bonds, with purchases ﬁ  nanced by the 
issue of Treasury bills and the Debt Management 
Ofﬁ   ce’s cash management operations. 
By 24 June 2010, GBP 51 million of commercial 
paper and GBP 351 million of corporate bonds 
had been bought. Apart from the purchase 
programs for gilts, corporate bonds, 
and commercial paper, the APF also comprises 
a Credit Guarantee Scheme (CGS), which offers 
to make small purchases of bonds issued by 
banks under the UK Treasury’s Credit Guarantee 
Scheme. To date, this facility has not been used. 
On 3 August 2009 the BoE launched, 
also through the APF, a Secured Commercial 
Paper (SCP) Facility, which enables 
investment-grade GBP asset-backed commercial 
paper securities that support the ﬁ  nancing  of 
working capital to be purchased in both the 
primary and secondary markets. No purchases 
had been made as at the end of June 2010. 
The APF was initially authorised by the UK Treasury to  11 
purchase up to a total of GBP 50 billion of private sector assets 
ﬁ   nanced by Treasury bills, thereby ensuring neutrality with 
respect to monetary policy. The scope of the APF was also 
designed so as to enable the Facility to be used by the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) as a monetary policy tool, by ﬁ  nancing 
purchases by issuing central bank reserves. For this purpose, the 
Facility was authorised to purchase up to GBP 150 billion, of 
which up to GBP 50 billion was to be used to purchase private 
sector assets. The MPC voted at its March 2009 policy meeting 
for the Facility to purchase GBP 75 billion of assets ﬁ  nanced by 
the issuance of central bank reserves. The MPC subsequently 
voted at its May 2009 policy meeting to increase this to a total 
GBP 125 billion of assets. The MPC voted for two further 
increases to its asset purchase programme in 2009. At its meeting 
in August, the MPC decided to ﬁ  nance a further GBP 50 billion 
of asset purchases so that total purchases would rise to 
GBP 175 billion. And at its meeting in November, the MPC 
voted to increase total asset purchases to GBP 200 billion. At its 
meeting in February 2010, the MPC voted to maintain the stock 
of asset purchases at GBP 200 billion but the MPC will continue 
to monitor the appropriate scale of the asset purchase programme 
and further purchases would be made should the outlook warrant 
them. The latest ﬁ  gures for asset purchases are available at http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/apf/results.htm.
Purchases of assets were undertaken by a subsidiary of the BoE,  12 
the BoE Asset Purchase Facility Fund Limited (BEAPFF). 
The BEAPFF borrowed from the BoE to pay for the purchases. 
Hence, the lending to the BEAPFF, rather than the purchased 
securities, appears as an asset in the BoE’s balance sheet.14
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Finally, a Supply Chain Finance Facility is 
currently being planned. This facility is intended 
to provide working-capital ﬁ   nancing to the 
suppliers of investment-grade companies.
In addition, on 21 April 2009 the BoE 
launched a swap scheme. The Special Liquidity 
Scheme allows banks to temporarily swap their 
high-quality mortgage-backed and other 
securities for UK Treasury bills for up to 
three years. Haircuts apply, and margins are 
calculated daily. The Scheme was designed to 
ﬁ  nance part of the overhang of illiquid assets 
on banks’ balance sheets by exchanging them 
temporarily for more easily tradable assets.
3.1.3 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
In the United States, the Federal Reserve System 
(the Fed) has adopted a range of non-standard 
measures in response to the current ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. These measures are reﬂ   ected in the 
establishment of several separate facilities that 
target speciﬁ  c  ﬁ   nancial institutions or market 
segments. Appendix 1 provides the details of 
these measures including the amounts committed 
and extended under each of the facilities.
The bulk of the measures (in terms of volumes) 
target ﬁ  nancial institutions. The most important 
innovation was the introduction of the Term 
Auction Facility (TAF), which allowed the 
Federal Reserve System to relieve pressures in 
short-term funding markets by auctioning term 
funds to depository institutions against full 
collateral. In addition, the Term Asset-backed 
Securities Loan Facility (TALF) was set up to 
help market participants meet the credit needs of 
households and small businesses by supporting 
the issuance of asset-backed securities (ABSs). 
Under the TALF, the Federal Reserve System 
set up an SPV to buy up to USD 1,000 billion of 
ABSs, granting the borrowers one and three-year 
loans; in exceptional cases, loans for up to 
ﬁ  ve years were granted.13 The SPV is partially 
funded through the US Treasury’s Troubled 
Assets Relief Program (TARP), which has 
purchased USD 20 billion of subordinated debt 
issued by the SPV.
Another important novelty for the Fed was 
the outright purchase of securities issued by 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
and of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) 
guaranteed by GSEs,  acquired via open 
market operations. The aim was to support the 
mortgage market, and the volumes involved 
were large: as of 28 April 2010, they amounted 
to USD 196 billion and USD 1,096 billion for 
GSE securities and MBSs, respectively. These 
securities are held in the System Open Market 
Account (SOMA), which is managed by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The Federal Reserve System also took measures 
to restore liquidity in short-term debt markets. 
The  Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(CPFF) is a limited liability company (LLC) 
that provides a liquidity backstop to US issuers 
of commercial paper and was intended to 
contribute to the liquidity in the short-term paper 
market. The Money Market Investor Funding 
Facility (MMIFF) was speciﬁ  cally  designed 
to restore liquidity in the money-market
and particularly the liquidity of money market 
funds.14 Both the CPFF and the MMIFF 
aimed to increase the availability of credit for 
businesses and households through a revival of 
short-term debt markets. Like the MMIFF, the 
Asset-backed Commercial Paper Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) has 
the objective of facilitating the sale of assets by 
money-market mutual funds in the secondary 
market to increase their liquidity.15
Two further facilities introduced in March 2009 
in support of primary dealers were: (i) the 
Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), 
an expansion of the Federal Reserve System’s 
securities lending program, under which up to 
USD 200 billion of treasury securities were 
The amount originally committed under TALF was  13 
USD 200 billion. This was increased to USD 1,000 billion in 
May 2009.
The facility became operational in November 2008 and expired  14 
in October 2009.
The AMLF was established shortly after the default of Lehman  15 
Brothers on 19 September 2008 and will be in effect until 
February 2010.15
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SUPPORT MEASURES lent to primary dealers and secured for a month 
(rather than overnight, as under the existing 
program) by a pledge of other securities as 
collateral;16 and (ii) the Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility (PDCF), which provides overnight 
funding to primary dealers in exchange for a 
speciﬁ  ed range of collateral, thereby improving 
the ability of primary dealers to provide ﬁ  nancing 
to participants in securitisation markets. 
The Federal Reserve System has also supported 
some ﬁ  nancial institutions directly. The so-called
Maiden Lane (M-L) transactions involved 
three separate Limited Liability Companies 
(LLCs), which acquired assets from Bear 
Stearns (ML-I) and AIG (ML-II, and 
ML-III).17 The Federal Reserve System provided 
USD 72.8 billion in senior loans to the LLCs. 
After the repayment of the loans, any remaining 
proceeds from ML-I are paid to the Federal 
Reserve System and, in the cases of ML-II
and ML-III, shared between the Federal 
Reserve System and AIG. The transactions 
thus resemble those of a so-called bad bank, 
which transfer assets off the institutions’ 
balance sheets. The Federal Reserve System 
also made a lending facility available to AIG 
in September 2008. In addition, the Federal 
Reserve System contributed to a ring-fencing 
agreement with Citigroup, which also involved 
the US Treasury and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), by committing 
to extend a non-recourse loan should the losses 
on the speciﬁ   ed asset pool exceed a certain 
threshold.18 The Fed did not extended credit 
to Citigroup under this agreement. The US 
Treasury, the FDIC and the Fed terminated 
this agreement on 23 December 2009. Finally, 
on 16 January 2009 the Fed, together with the 
US Treasury and the FDIC, agreed to provide 
support to Bank of America, involving a ring-
fencing arrangement on a pool of assets. 
However, following the release of the results of 
the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program, 
the support package was abandoned without 
having been implemented, and Bank of America 
paid an exit fee of USD 425 billion, out of which 
USD 57 billion was allocated to the Fed.
The Federal Reserve System has already 
implemented an exit from most of the facilities. 
In June 2009, the Federal Reserve System 
announced its intention to scale back its 
commitments under the TSLF from 
USD 200 billion to USD 75 billion. Further to 
this, the amounts auctioned at the TAF’s 
biweekly auctions were gradually decreased, 
given the reduced demand for this facility.19 
The ﬁ  nal auction under TAF was conducted in 
March 2010 and credit extended under that 
auction matured in April 2010. As a result of 
improving market conditions, the Fed ended the 
AMLF, TSLF, PDCF and the CPFF. All loans 
under the programmes have been repaid and all 
commercial paper holdings under CPFF had 
matured by April 2010. In addition, the MMIFF, 
which had not been drawn upon, expired on 
30 October 2009. With regard to TALF, 
the offering of loans against newly issued 
ABS and legacy CMBS was discontinued on 
31 March 2010 while loans against newly issued 
CMBS continue until 30 June 2010. Finally, 
the Federal Reserve System withdrew the 
programme to guarantee newly issued bank debt 
securities in October 2009.
The Open Market Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of  16 
New York auctioned general Treasury collateral (Treasury bills, 
notes, bonds and inﬂ  ation-indexed securities) held by SOMA 
for loan against all collateral eligible for tri-party repurchase 
agreements arranged by the Open Market Trading Desk under 
Schedule 1 and, separately, against Schedule 1 collateral and 
investment grade corporate securities, municipal securities, 
mortgage-backed securities, and asset-backed securities under 
Schedule 2.
The two Maiden Lane transactions involving AIG differ in terms  17 
of the acquired asset pools. ML-II involved the purchase of 
residential mortgage-backed securities and ML-III the purchase 
of multi-sector collateralised debt obligations.
The loss-sharing arrangement is complex: Citigroup will  18 
cover the ﬁ  rst USD 39.5 billion of losses on an asset pool of 
USD 301 billion; the U.S. Treasury will absorb 90% of the 
second loss tranche up to USD 5 billion, with Citigroup covering 
the remainder; the FDIC will absorb 90% of the third loss tranche 
up to USD 10 billion, with Citigroup covering the remainder; 
should even higher losses materialise, the Federal Reserve will 
extend a non-recourse loan to cover the rest of the asset pool, 
with Citigroup being required to immediately repay 10% of such 
losses to the Federal Reserve.
The TAF auctions were reduced from USD 150 billion to  19 
USD 125 billion in July 2009, to USD 100 billion in August 2009 
and to USD 75 billion in September 2009.16
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The different measures vary to with respect 
to their implication for the Federal Reserve 
System’s proﬁ   tability but so far have not 
incurred a loss. The investments in GSE 
securities and in MBSs guaranteed by the GSEs 
contributed about USD 36 billion of net earnings 
of SOMA from January 2009 to March 2010. 
In addition, the loan programs (AMLF, PDCF, 
TALF, and the credit line to AIG) earned 
USD 5.2 billion over the period, which translates 
into USD 2.6 billion net of provisions for loan 
restructuring. TAF earned USD 0.8 billion 
in the same period. However, while the Fed 
earned a combined proﬁ  t of USD 8.4 billion on 
the consolidated LLCs (CPFF, ML-I, ML-II,
and ML-III), the picture is more mixed with 
regard to the income sources: while all LLCs 
earned sizable interest income, the ML LLCs 
suffered from losses on their portfolio holdings 
in 2009, which could only be recouped during 
the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2010.20 In sum, some of the 
non-standard measures involved sizeable risks 
for the Federal Reserve System.
3.1.4 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EUROSYSTEM, 
THE BANK OF ENGLAND, AND THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM
The efforts undertaken by central banks are 
reﬂ   ected in the expansion of their balance 
sheets. Chart 2 shows the main components of 
the balance sheets of the Eurosystem, the Bank 
of England, and the US Federal Reserve System. 
Starting in Spring 2008, the Federal Reserve 
System extended its term auction facilities and 
repo business, albeit offsetting the effect on 
its balance sheet by reducing the portfolio of 
securities it held outright. In September 2008, 
however, the Federal Reserve System gave up 
its sterilisation policy and allowed its balance 
sheet to more than double in size. Likewise, 
owing to repo transactions and lending to the 
BEAPFF, the Bank of England doubled the 
size of its balance sheet. By October 2008 it 
had even allowed it to triple in size. In contrast, 
the Eurosystem’s balance sheet has been 
expanded to a lesser extent.
The difference can partly be attributed to the 
speciﬁ   c features of the respective ﬁ  nancial 
systems and to different operational frameworks, 
i.e. the number of eligible institutions with 
access to the Fed’s facilities vis–à-vis the 
Eurosystem that require different actions.21 
In addition, differences are partly due to the fact 
that national governments remain responsible 
for ﬁ  scal policies in Europe.
The most important difference between Europe 
and the United States is the fact that the Federal 
Reserve System has been supporting individual 
institutions, while the Eurosystem’s and the BoE’s 
role has been limited to liquidity extension.
Another important difference in the policies 
adopted lies in the extent of repurchase 
agreements and outright purchases of securities. 
In contrast to the Federal Reserve System, 
both the Eurosystem and the BoE have used 
repurchase agreements extensively. However, 
while the Eurosystem is active only in the 
covered bonds market, and only to a very limited 
extent, the Federal Reserve System’s strategy is 
partly based on large-scale outright purchases of 
government bonds and private sector securities. 
The BoE also buys securities outright, 
but limits its acquisitions mostly to government 
bonds. In addition, a government indemnity 
shields it from any losses resulting from these 
investments. As at the Federal Reserve System, 
the BoE allowed these purchases to increase 
reserve balances.
These ﬁ  gures are taken from the Federal Reserve System Monthly  20 
Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet. 
Proﬁ  ts and losses refer to the four quarters of 2009 and the ﬁ  rst 
quarter in 2010.
Mr. Trichet in a speech at the University of Munich, 13 June 2009.  21 
The IMF makes the same point in a recent publication: Fiscal 
Implications of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis, IMF 
staff position note SPN/09/13).17
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Chart 2 Balance sheets of the Eurosystem, the Bank of England, and the US Federal Reserve System
Eurosystem: 
Total assets (EUR trillion)
Bank of England: 
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1) Reserve bank credit accounts for about 99% of the Federal Reserve System’s balance sheet.18
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3.2 GOVERNMENT  MEASURES
Central banks have not acted alone in attempting 
to stem the effects of the crisis. Governments 
also came to the rescue of ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
in particular after Lehman Brothers collapsed. 
In this sub-section, we outline general aspects 
of the institutional set-up for government 
measures, before discussing chronologically the 
various measures that have been implemented 
during the crisis.
3.2.1 GENERAL ASPECTS
INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED, ELIGIBILITY, 
AND CONDITIONALITY
The management of the support measures varies 
widely across countries, with the number of 
institutions involved differing from country 
to country (see Table 8 in Appendix 2 for 
details). At one extreme, all measures have been 
handled by a single institution (as in the case 
of Germany), while in other countries separate 
institutions have been responsible for different 
measures. Typically, the measures have been 
implemented by Ministries of Finance, but with 
the involvement of the national central bank 
and/or the supervisory authority.
The support measures have typically applied 
to ﬁ  nancial institutions operating in a country 
and to foreign subsidiaries with substantial 
domestic operations. Support has typically 
been provided upon request from a ﬁ  nancial 
institution, although, in a number of cases, 
banks have also been instructed to accept 
government support (for example in the 
United States and France).
Similar conditions for all types of support 
measures have been implemented in all countries 
and typically involve restrictions on dividend 
payments, regular reporting on business 
developments, restructuring requirements, 
government participation in banks’ management, 
and restrictions on executive compensation. 
In addition, government support in some cases 
also entailed explicit targets for lending growth, 
with the objective of maintaining the supply of 
credit to the economy (for example in France, 
Ireland, and the UK).
AD HOC MEASURES VS NATIONAL SCHEMES
At the outset, the ﬁ  nancial turmoil manifested 
itself at the level of individual ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, and governments, therefore, had 
recourse to ad hoc measures tailored to the needs 
of these institutions. As the crisis intensiﬁ  ed, 
however, in October 2008 and it became clear 
that interventions had to be extended to a larger 
number of banks, more comprehensive schemes 
were adopted in a number of countries. One of 
the ﬁ  rst schemes was the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program, better known by the acronym TARP 
(outlined in Appendix 1). As the crisis deepened, 
other countries began to establish ﬁ  nancial 
support schemes, for example the Financial 
Market Stabilisation Fund (SoFFin) in Germany 
on 17 October 2008. The distinguishing feature 
of these schemes was that they established 
a more transparent system through which 
banks could obtain ﬁ  nancial  support. More 
speciﬁ  cally, transparency was provided by the 
overall commitment of governments to support 
the  ﬁ   nancial system. Typically, the schemes 
Chart 2 Balance sheets of the Eurosystem, 
the Bank of England, and the US Federal 
Reserve System (cont’d)
US Federal Reserve System: 
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Sources: Federal Reserve System, Bank of England, European 
Central Bank and ECB calculations. 19
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SUPPORT MEASURES also had speciﬁ  c criteria for eligibility, pricing, 
and the duration of support measures available 
under the schemes.
While ad hoc measures can be, and were, 
implemented rapidly and ﬂ  exibly, the advantage 
of national schemes is threefold. First, national 
schemes have often considerably increased 
transparency in comparison with ad hoc 
measures.  The degree of transparency and 
accountability involved in support to the ﬁ  nancial 
system is important and largely depends on the 
institutional framework. This was highlighted by 
the uncertainty caused in the United States by the 
decisions to intervene in the case of Bear Stearns 
and American International Group but not in that 
of Lehman Brothers (see Taylor, 2008). Clarity 
of the support criteria signals to the wider 
public that the government stands ready to curb 
the crisis from widening and is important to 
stabilise conﬁ  dence. More generally, clear and 
transparent support measures for banks, 
combined with strict conditions, may contribute 
to the success of banks’ restructuring. In sum, 
the advantage of an explicit scheme resides in 
transparency regarding the institutions eligible, 
the volume of support available, the pricing and 
the duration.
Second,  national schemes are less likely to 
distort competition within and across countries 
than ad hoc measures. There is a risk that 
support measures will distort the level playing 
ﬁ  eld. This may be the case both within a single 
country and across countries. This international 
dimension is particularly relevant for Europe, 
owing to its high degree of ﬁ  nancial integration. 
To limit this danger, European countries agreed 
on a concerted action plan (see Box 2 for details). 
They committed themselves to adhere to certain 
principles in their crisis response measures so 
that “the European Union as a whole can act in a 
united manner and avoid that national measures 
adversely affect the functioning of the single 
market and the other member States.”22
Third, in the European context, approval of a 
particular measure by the European Commission 
(EC) may be simpler if it is part of a national 
scheme.  In the European Union, national 
intervention requires approval by the EC, which 
aims to ensure that the measures do not distort 
competition (see Box 3). Each individual 
measure requires approval, while measures that 
are part of a scheme are typically subject to the 
scheme’s approval. This represents a further 
advantage of explicit schemes over ad hoc 
measures. Generally, the EC assesses the 
eligibility of institutions, the volume of support 
and the pricing to ensure a level playing ﬁ  eld. 
However, possible delays in the approval of 
government support measures may cause 
considerable concern over the effectiveness of 
the measures and the deterioration of the 
situation of the bank or banks under 
consideration. That said, approval by the EC has 
typically been rapid. In a number of cases, 
however, considerable delays have occurred 
when restructuring requirements entailed 
lengthy negotiations with the national 
authorities. This was an issue in particular for 
the few cases that involved support by several 
governments for the same institution, i.e. Dexia 
and Fortis (see Box 4). The EC extended 
approvals for capital injections for a period of 
six months, after which the decision were to be 
reappraised, on the basis of a progress report 
(EC, 2009). In August 2009, the EC clariﬁ  ed the 
framework for its examination of viability and 
restructuring plans of banks, which are to be 
submitted following the provision of state aid 
(see Box 3).23 In particular, the EC takes into 
account: (i) the past practice of the EC; 
(ii) the global scale of the present crisis; 
(iii) the systemic role of the banking sector for 
the whole economy; and (iv) the possible 
systemic effects arising from the need for a 
number of banks to restructure within the 
same period. 
Declaration of the emergency summit of euro area heads of  22 
government in Paris on 12 October 2008. The declaration 
is available at http://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil/
PFUE-10_2008/PFUE-12.10.2008/sommet_pays_zone_euro_
declaration_plan_action_concertee.html.
The communication “The return to viability and the assessment  23 
under the State aid rules of restructuring measures in the ﬁ  nancial 
sector in the current crisis” was published on 22 July 2009. 
The adoption of the Communication was ﬁ  nalised through its 
publication in the Ofﬁ  cial Journal.20
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Box 2
THE CONCERTED EUROPEAN APPROACH
During an emergency summit in Paris on 12 October 2008, euro area heads of government 
agreed on a concerted European action plan. They decided to “complement the actions taken 
by the ECB in the interbank money market” and support fundamentally sound banks.1 
The summit paved the way for a concerted and coordinated EU approach to (i) harmonising the 
provision of retail deposit insurance; (ii) issuing government guarantees for bank debt securities; 
(iii) making available funds for bank recapitalisations; and (iv) providing asset relief measures.
In accordance with the Paris summit declaration, the ECB drew up recommendations on the 
appropriate framework for granting government guarantees on bank debt issuance.2 Among other 
things, the ECB recommended that guarantees on interbank deposits should not be provided. 
Furthermore, it recommended that the pricing of guarantees be based, where available, on banks’ 
CDS spreads, and that an add-on fee of 50 basis points be charged to ensure that governments 
got fair compensation and that market distortions were minimised.
The ECB also published recommendations on the pricing of the recapitalisation schemes.3 
The valuation of the instruments chosen for capital injections should be based on market pricing 
in line with the instrument and its corresponding risk as well as the speciﬁ  c risk of the institution. 
In addition, the injections should have an explicit exit strategy to retain the temporary nature of 
the state’s involvement.
The ECB also drew up guiding principles for bank asset support measures.4 According to these 
principles, the participation of banks should be voluntary. Furthermore, the deﬁ  nition of assets 
eligible for support should be broad, the degree of risk sharing should be adequate, and the 
duration of the support scheme should possibly match the maturity structure of the assets. With 
respect to the pricing of the scheme, the ECB acknowledged that this was a crucial and complex 
issue. The ECB did not recommend a speciﬁ  c method, but called for transparency and for a range 
of approaches to be followed, including the use of expert opinions. It expressed a preference for 
the adoption of common criteria across countries.
1 The declaration of the summit is available at http://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil/PFUE-10_2008/PFUE-12.10.2008/
sommet_pays_zone_euro_declaration_plan_action_concertee.html. The declaration also mentions two further aims: ensuring sufﬁ  cient 
ﬂ  exibility in the implementation of accounting rules, given current exceptional market circumstances, and enhancing cooperation 
procedures among European countries. These are beyond the scope of this paper.
2  The recommendations are available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/recommendations_on_guaranteesen.pdf.
3 The recommendations are available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/recommendations_on_pricing_for_recapitalisationsen.pdf. 
The respective European Commission recommendations are available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:C:2009:010:0002:0010:EN:PDF.
4  The recommendations are available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/guidingprinciplesbankassetsupportschemesen.pdf. 
The respective European Commission recommendations are available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/
impaired_assets.pdf.21
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Box 3
STATE AID CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
To ensure that government interventions do not distort competition and intra-community trade, 
the European Union has a complex system of State aid control.1 The granting of exemptions 
to the general prohibition of State aid rests exclusively with the European Commission (EC), 
which possesses strong investigative and decision-making powers.2 At the heart of these powers 
lies the notiﬁ  cation procedure, which (except in certain instances) the Member States have to 
follow. It is only after approval by the EC that an aid measure can be implemented. Moreover, 
the EC has the power to recover incompatible State aid.
Since the onset of the current crisis, the EC has dealt with a number of State aid cases, resulting 
from interventions by Member States to avoid liquidity, solvency or lending problems. The EC 
has provided guidance, in three successive communications, on the design and implementation 
of State aid to banks.
EU countries providing State aid to a ﬁ  nancial institution are obliged to submit a viability plan, 
or a more fundamental restructuring plan, to conﬁ  rm or re-establish the individual banks’ 
long-term viability without reliance on State support. The EC has established criteria to delineate 
the conditions under which a bank may need to be subject to more substantial restructuring, and 
when measures are needed to cater for distortions of competition resulting from the aid.
Restructuring plan
The criteria and speciﬁ  c circumstances that trigger the obligation to present a restructuring plan 
refer mostly to situations where a distressed bank has been recapitalised by the State, or when the 
bank beneﬁ  ting from asset relief has already received State aid in whatever form that contributes 
to coverage or avoidance of losses (except participation in a guarantee scheme), which altogether 
exceeds 2% of the bank’s total risk-weighted assets.3 The degree of restructuring will depend on 
the seriousness of the problems of the bank concerned and can be sizable: banks are often forced 
to shrink by 40% or more from their peak size.
Viability plan
By contrast, where a limited amount of aid has been given to banks which are fundamentally 
sound, Member States are required to submit a report to the EC on the use of State funds 
comprising all the information necessary to evaluate the bank’s viability, the use of the capital 
received and the path towards exit from reliance on State support. The viability review should 
demonstrate the risk proﬁ  le and prospective capital adequacy of these banks and evaluate their 
business plans.
In addition to State aid control, the EC also has an important role in approving mergers that have 
an EU dimension.
1  State aid is deﬁ  ned as an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by national public 
authorities.
2  The EC’s competition department (DG-COMP) is responsible for the control of State aid to the ﬁ  nancial sector.
3  The criteria and speciﬁ  c circumstances that trigger the obligation to present a restructuring plan have been explained in the Banking 
Communication, the Recapitalisation Communication and the Impaired Assets Communication.22
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Box 4
CROSS-BORDER BANK RESCUES IN EUROPE
This box shows, by giving examples, how complex the rescue of cross-border banks can be. 
The cases of Fortis and Dexia are two prominent examples in Europe.
Fortis
On 28 September 2008 the three Benelux governments agreed to partly nationalise Fortis, 
a Belgo-Dutch banking and insurance group, with a €11.2 billion capital injection. The agreed 
burden sharing was originally as follows: €4.7 billion from Belgium, €4 billion from the 
Netherlands and €2.5 billion from Luxembourg. As a result, each government was to acquire 
49% of the banking institution in their country. In fact, the Belgian authorities invested in Fortis’ 
overall banking division, while the Dutch and Luxembourg authorities received stakes in Fortis’ 
national banking divisions. Subsequently however, the rescue plan was abandoned and replaced 
by different solutions in the Netherlands and in Belgium/Luxembourg that led to the ﬁ  nal 
break-up of Fortis.
On 3 October 2008 the Dutch government fully nationalised Fortis Netherlands, buying 
100% of the shares for €16.8 billion. The acquisition of Fortis Bank Nederland NV included 
Fortis’ stake in ABN AMRO Holding NV and its Dutch insurance activities. In contrast to the 
nationalisation in the Netherlands, the Belgian and Luxembourg parts of Fortis were sold in a 
private takeover on 6 October, with BNP Paribas (BNPP) buying 75% of Fortis Belgium and 
67% of Fortis Luxembourg for €14.5 billion. The Belgian government retained a 25% stake 
in Fortis Belgium. For this transaction to take place, the government had to buy the remaining 
51% of the shares (investing another €4.7 billion) before transferring 75% of shares to BNPP. 
Also, Fortis Insurance Belgium was entirely acquired by BNPP for €5.73 billion in cash. 
Several organisations representing Fortis shareholders immediately announced legal action 
to challenge this agreement. On 6 November, the public attorney of the Brussels Tribunal of 
Commerce accepted their reasoning and declared the sell-off process irregular. In Luxembourg, 
the government holds 33% of Fortis Luxembourg, now renamed BGL.
Dexia
On 30 September 2008 the French, Belgian and Luxembourg public authorities injected 
€6.4 billion of capital into Dexia. The burden sharing was complex: in Belgium (€3 billion), the 
government, the three Belgian regions, and three Belgian institutional shareholders (Gemeentelijke 
Holding NV, Arcoﬁ  n CV and Ethias) invested €1 billion each in Dexia SA; in France (€3 billion), 
the French government invested €1 billion in Dexia SA, and Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations 
contributed €2 billion; in Luxembourg, the government disbursed €376 million for purchasing 
convertible bonds issued by Dexia Banque Internationale à Luxembourg SA.
On 9 October 2008 the Belgian, French and Luxembourg governments agreed to guarantee 
Dexia’s liabilities to credit institutions and institutional counterparties, as well as bonds and 
other debt securities issued to the same counterparties. The objective was to assist the bank in 
regaining access to funding markets. The eligible liabilities, bonds and securities are required 
to fall due before 31 October 2011 and must have been contracted, issued or renewed between 23
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3.2.2 MEASURES ADOPTED
Table 1 gives an overview of the support measures 
adopted, while Appendix 3 outlines the data 
collection methods employed. The table includes 
primarily data on all support measures taken 
by governments in response to the worsening 
of the crisis after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, mainly from 1 October 2008 onwards. 
Support measures are classiﬁ  ed  according 
to three main categories: (i) guarantees for 
bank liabilities; (ii) recapitalisation measures 
(capital injections); and (iii) measures to 
provide relief from legacy assets (asset support). 
Table 1 distinguishes between the amounts that 
governments have committed themselves to 
providing (shown in brackets) and the amounts 
that have already been extended to ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. Table 1 also shows the amounts 
committed and extended under national schemes 
and outside such schemes (i.e. ad hoc measures). 
The total commitment in terms of GDP is the 
sum of the commitments of national schemes 
across the three categories (or the actual amount 
spent in the absence of explicit commitments) 
plus the actual amounts spent outside national 
schemes.
 Regarding the implementation of the measures, 
some conclusions can be drawn. Chart 3 provides 
the rates at which measures have been extended 
relative to the committed amounts within national 
schemes The take-up rate is generally low across 
all measures, but there are substantial variations: 
the use of recapitalisation measures has been 
relatively widespread, while the issuance of bank 
bonds with government guarantees has been 
considerable lower, albeit with an increasing 
take-up rate over the last few months. It should 
be noted that there are signiﬁ  cant  differences 
between countries and that the volume and use 
of liability guarantees in absolute ﬁ  gures  are 
far higher than the volume and use of capital 
injections. Furthermore, it seems that the largest 
part of the ﬁ  nancial support has been targeted 
to a relatively small number of institutions 
(see Chart 4). Indeed, according to publicly 
available data, between 37 and 63 percent of the 
support extended under capital, guarantee and 
asset protection schemes has been absorbed by 
the largest three recipient institutions. In the case 
of each individual support measure, the three 
largest recipients account for 3% to 9% of total 
euro area banking assets.
9 October 2008 and 31 October 2009. The guarantee, which may be renewed for a term of one 
year, is subject to remuneration reﬂ  ecting the advantage thus obtained by the entities of the Dexia 
Group concerned. It consolidates the activity of the entire Group, including its US subsidiary, 
FSA. The guarantee is assumed jointly by the French, Belgian and Luxembourg Governments 
and has a cap of €150 billion.
The experience of these two cross-border bank rescues shows that problems stem inter alia from 
a lack of clarity with regard to the national authorities to be involved in the rescue process, 
the extraordinary time pressure necessary to delineate the rescue operation and subsequent 
disagreement over burden sharing. These problems could be at least partially avoided under an 
orderly framework which sets criteria for the rescue process and provides a feasible time frame 
for the process. In the case of Fortis, it has been argued that the ultimate break-up could have 
been avoided if the process had been pursued under an explicit framework.
1  The aggregate guaranteed amount is published on a daily basis on the following website: http://www.nbb.be/DOC/DQ/warandia/index.
htm. Accordingly, investors can monitor the total amount under guarantee, compared with the total cap of the guarantee.24
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Table 1 Government support measures to financial institutions since October 2008, 
as of end-May 2010
(billions of EUR unless stated otherwise)
Country



















as % 2008 
GDP in EUR
Europe total 122 (320) 114.1 725.7 (2,182) 232 (10) 89.9 (279) 297.8 26
EU total 122 (310) 114.1 725.7 (2,142) 232 (10) 48.7 (238) 297.8 26
Euro area 84.2 (231) 75.9 506.2 (1,694) 229 (-) 48.7 (238) 80.0 28
AT 5.8 (15) 0.6 21.8 (75) 0 (-) - (-) - 32 Unlimited
BE -(-) 19.9 34 (-) 90.8 (-) - (-) 16.8 47 100,000
CY -(-) - - (3) 0 (-) - (-) - 18 100,000
DE 29.4 (40) 24.8 110.8 (400) 75 (-) 17 (40) 39.3 25 Unlimited
ES 11 (99) 1.3 56.4 (100) 9 (-) 19.3 (50) 2.5 24 100,000
FI - (4) - - (50) 0 (-) -(-) - 29 50,000
FR  8.3 (21)  3  134.2 (320)  0 (-)  -(-)  - 18  70,000
GR  3.2 (5)  - 14.4 (30)  0 (-)  4.4 (8)  - 18  100,000
IE  12.3 (10)  7  72.5 (485)  0 (-)  8 (90)  - 319 Unlimited
IT  4.1 (12)  - -(-)  0 (-)  - (50)  - 4  103,291
LU  -(-)  2.5  2.5 (-)  4.5 (-)  - (-)  - 26  100,000
MT  -(-)  - -(-)  0 (-)  - (-)  - - 100,000
NL  10.2 (20)  16.8  54.2 (200)  50 (-)  - (-)  21.4  52  100,000
PT  - (4)  - 5.4 (16)  0 (-)  - (-)  - 12  100,000
SI  -(-)  - - (12)  0 (-)  - (-)  - 32  Unlimited
SK  - (1)  - - (3)  0 (-)  - (-)  - - Unlimited
Other EU  37.8 (79)  38.3  219.6 (448)  2.8 (10)  - (-)  217.8  22
BG  -(-)  - -(-)  0 (-)  - (-)  - - 50,000
CZ  -(-)  - -(-)  0 (-)  - (-)  - - 50,000
DK  3.5 (13)  2.2  36.9 (-)  0 (-)  - (-)  - 23  Unlimited
EE  -(-)  - -(-)  0 (-)  - (-)  - - 50,000
HU  0.1 (1)  - -(-)  2.3 (5)  - (-)  - 7  45,252
LV  -(-)  0.3  - (6)  0 (-)  - (-)  - 27  50,000
LT  -(-)  - -(-)  0 (-)  - (-)  - - 100,000
PL  - (5)  - -(-)  0 (5)  - (-)  - 3  50,000
RO  -(-)  - -(-)  0 (-)  - (-)  - - 50,000
SE  0.5 (5)  - 25.4 (142)  0.5 (-)  - (-)  - 49  47,465
UK  33.7 (55)  35.8  157.2 (300)  0 (-)  - (-)  217.8  25  54,511
Other Europe  - (10)  - - (40)  0 (-)  41.2 (41)  - 14
CH  - (4)  - -(-)  0 (-)  41.2 (41)  - 13  66,388
NO  - (6)  - - (40)  0 (-)  - (-)  - 15  227,273
Other  216.2 (580)  19.1  369.8 (1,066)  26.7 (534)  40 (1,148)  74.9  30
AU  -(-)  - 118.6 (602)  0 (-)  - (-)  - 97  Unlimited
US  216.2 (580)  19.1  251.2 (464)  26.7 (534)  40 (1,148)  74.9  26  190,680
Sources: National authorities; Bloomberg; ECB calculations.
Notes: Numbers are cumulative since October 2008 and given in billions of euros unless stated otherwise. Numbers in brackets show total 
commitments to each measure. Some of the measures may not have been used, even though they have been announced. Outside schemes 
are support measures implemented without explicitly setting up a scheme, i.e. direct government support, e.g. from local governments, 
as in the case of BayernLB receiving support from the state of Bavaria. The capital injection outside a scheme by the Netherlands consists 
of the purchase of the Dutch part of ABN AMRO from Fortis by the Dutch government. The asset protection commitment in Ireland is the 
predicted maximum amount of assets bought by NAMA. The amount used is likely to be lower given the planned haircuts to be applied 
to the assets. The total commitment of Ireland includes the government guarantee of the entire liabilities of banks. The total commitment 
for other countries providing unlimited deposit insurance would rise if this were incorporated. Spain has a capital injection program, 
but did not commit a speciﬁ  ed amount of 27 funds. For the United States, numbers in brackets show commitments under TARP and for 
government sponsored entities. Also note that in some cases an allocation of commitments to speciﬁ  c measures was not feasible. In the 
case of Germany, up to €80 billion is assigned to capital injections and asset support, without an exact ﬁ  gure being assigned to each 
measure.25
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The subsequent sections provide a more 
detailed description of the measures in the 
chronological order in which they have 
generally been adopted.24
ENHANCED DEPOSIT INSURANCE
Deposit insurance schemes were among the 
ﬁ   rst measures used to quell the impact of 
the  ﬁ   nancial turmoil that intensiﬁ   ed after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. In Europe, before 
the crisis, EU legislation stipulated a minimum 
level of deposit insurance of €20,000, with an 
optional coinsurance element of 10%. However, 
as this deposit coverage proved insufﬁ  cient  to 
calm depositor concerns, the limit was raised in 
October 2008 to a minimum of €50,000, which 
As this paper focuses the order in which the different measures  24 
were generally adopted, it does not provide information on 
the dates at which speciﬁ   c schemes or individual measures 
were taken. Instead, the interested reader is referred to other 
papers that give details on the timing of support measures 
(e.g. Petrovic and Tutsch (2009). “National Rescue Measures in 
Response to the Current Financial Crisis”, ECB Legal Working 
Paper No. 8, July; XXX). Furthermore, the Fed provides 
a timeline on its website (http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/
global_economy/IRCTimelinePublic.pdf).
Chart 3 Take-up rates within national 
support schemes
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Sources: National authorities, Bloomberg and ECB calculations.
Chart 4 Concentration ratio of implemented 
measures in the euro area


































Sources: National authorities, Bloomberg and ECB calculations.
Note: The concentration ratio CR3 gives the share of the 
implemented support measures that has been absorbed by the 
largest three recipient institutions.26
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may rise to €100,000 by the end of 2010.25 
In addition, EU countries agreed to speed up the 
repayment of guaranteed deposits in an effort to 
enhance the effectiveness of deposit insurance.
One of the main events that led to the raising of 
the minimum level of deposit insurance was the 
unilateral move by Ireland in September 2008 to 
provide a blanket guarantee for virtually all 
bank liabilities (including retail, corporate, 
and interbank deposits).26 As shown in Table 1, 
this blanket guarantee is sizeable as a percentage 
of GDP. This move raised concerns over a 
competitive advantage for Irish banks.27 
The Irish blanket guarantee, combined with the 
experience of depositor runs on Northern Rock, 
the failed UK bank, led other countries to reform 
their own deposit insurance schemes. In the UK, 
until October 2007 deposit insurance covered 
100% of the ﬁ  rst GBP 2,000 and 90% of the 
next GBP 33,000. The run on Northern Rock 
led the UK government to guarantee the bank’s 
remaining deposits on concerns that these events 
could also trigger runs on other banks. 
The experience of Northern Rock also played a 
role in the move away from co-insurance. 
Table 1 shows that deposit insurance has been 
raised beyond €50,000 in the majority of 
countries and, in a number of cases, blanket 
guarantees have been issued for retail deposits 
(e.g. Germany). In the case of the United States, 
deposit insurance has been temporarily raised to 
USD 250,000 and will return to USD 100,000 in 
January 2014. In addition, the FDIC is offering 
full coverage of non-interest bearing deposit 
transaction accounts, regardless of their dollar 
amount, under the Transaction Account 
Guarantee, which is part of the Temporary 
Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP).28
GUARANTEES ON BANK BONDS
Apart from increasing deposit insurance, 
the provision of government guarantees on 
bank bonds were among the ﬁ  rst  measures 
implemented in support of banks. Table 1 shows 
that several countries committed large amounts 
to guaranteeing bank bond issues. The usage of 
government guarantees was slow to materialise 
(Chart 5). While a number of debt guarantees 
schemes were available from early October 2008, 
issuance had only gained momentum by mid-
November. Notably, Europe and the euro area 
led the way in this issuance and still account 
for the majority of all outstanding government-
guaranteed debt. Despite the increasing volumes, 
the take-up rate is still low (Chart 3). In Finland 
and Italy, for instance, schemes have been 
implemented, but no bank has so far made use 
of them. In other countries, few banks applied 
and the amounts issued are low. In the United 
States, guarantees on bonds are offered under 
the  Debt Guarantee Program, which is also 
part of the TLGP managed by the FDIC. Banks 
could choose to opt out of one or both of the 
programmes offered under the TLGP.
Agreement on 7 October 2008 at the Ecoﬁ   n meeting of EU  25 
ministers of ﬁ  nance:  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecoﬁ  n/103250.pdf
Liabilities covered include all retail and corporate deposits (to the  26 
extent not covered by existing deposit protection schemes in Ireland 
or any other jurisdiction); interbank deposits; senior unsecured 
debt; covered bonds; and dated subordinated debt (lower Tier 2).
Anecdotal evidence showed that depositors in the UK reacted to  27 
the increased coverage in Ireland by transferring money out of 
UK banks into the UK branches of Irish banks.
The participation fee for the Transaction Account Guarantee  28 
consists of a 10 basis point annual rate surcharge on non-interest-
bearing transaction deposit amounts over USD 250,000.
Chart 5 Volume of outstanding government 











































Sources: Bloomberg and ECB calculations.27
ECB
Occasional Paper No 117
July 2010
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SUPPORT MEASURES The generally sluggish take-up may be explained 
by several factors, including: (i) pricing 
(see below); (ii) the perceived high degree of 
competition between ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial 
issuers in the corporate bond markets; (iii) the 
potential for stigma effects; (iv) the conditions 
of the guarantees (for example, restrictions on 
remuneration); and (v) decreased medium-term 
funding needs, owing to ongoing deleveraging 
by banks and the general slowdown in demand 
for credit.
One major factor limiting the issuance of 
guaranteed bonds was the cost entailed by doing 
so. First, the cost of issuing long-term debt – 
be it guaranteed or not – is expensive given the 
current market sentiment; it is becoming 
increasingly expensive vis-à-vis short-term 
funding sources, as the yield curve has 
steepened.29 
With regard to the pricing of guarantees, banks 
typically pay a market-based fee linked to the 
bank’s credit risk, plus a margin. Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand have relied on bank 
ratings to determine the market-based fee, while 
Europe has relied on banks’ CDS spreads as the 
basis for their pricing. In addition, while the 
term structure of the guaranteed debt is the sole 
determinant of the fee in the United States, it is 
only one of the determinants of the pricing in 
the Netherlands and New Zealand (See Reserve 
Bank of Australia, 2009). 
Given that CDS spreads, which often formed the 
basis for the calculation of guarantee fees, have 
been at historically high levels since the onset of 
the crisis, government-guaranteed bonds can be 
an expensive funding source. The market also 
requires a relatively high liquidity premium on 
guaranteed bank debt, over government debt. 
Finally, the pricing of bonds has been based on 
the respective government spreads, which have 
also risen, thereby giving rise to further reasons 
for the reluctance to use government-guaranteed 
debt (Chart 6). The rise in these spreads has been 
largely mirrored by government-guaranteed 
bank bonds (Chart 7) and may represent an 
important competitive disadvantage for banks 
located in countries with higher spreads.
While banks seem unconcerned about short-term roll-over risk,  29 
there is anecdotal evidence that some banks are concerned 
about the roll-over risks they would face in issuing government-
guaranteed bonds at the time the guarantee expired (after two to 
three years in some countries and up to ﬁ  ve years in others).
Chart 6 Euro area sovereign bond spreads
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Although the uptake of government guarantees 
by banks has been sluggish, this source of 
funding represents a signiﬁ  cant part of banks’ 
total funding in the securities market. Chart 8 
shows the issuance and maturity of senior 
bank debt in the euro area over the period 
October 2008 to June 2010. In some months, 
the issuance of guaranteed bonds represented 
more than half of the total issuance of bonds. 
Chart 9 displays the cumulated issuance and 
maturity of bonds in the euro area, the UK 
and the US over the period 1 October 2008 to 
24 June 2010. It shows that the availability of 
government guarantees helped banks in all 
three regions to roll over their maturing debt.
Table 2 presents bond-speciﬁ  c  characteristics 
of bank debt guaranteed by governments and 
issued since October 2008. It shows that the 
duration and size of bond issues vary widely 
both within and across countries. The mean 
maturity at issuance is around three years in 
most countries, but the span of actual maturities 
at issuance ranges from 16 months in the case of 
Germany to 59 months in that of the Netherlands. 
In the European Union, the term structure of 
the guaranteed debt was initially limited to a 
maximum of three years but has subsequently 
been raised in a number of countries as debt 
matured. However, guarantees on debt with a 
maturity of three to ﬁ  ve years have been granted 
only in exceptional circumstances. The increase 
in the maximum maturity has partly been 
justiﬁ  ed by the slow take-up of guarantees, as 
banks have cited the short maturity offered in 
their jurisdictions as the main reason for not 
taking advantage of this form of support.
In addition to maturity restrictions, some 
countries have also put restrictions in place 
that limit the overall amount of government-
guaranteed debt relative to the total outstanding 
amount of senior unsecured debt (for example, 
the United States). The average residual maturity 
shows that about half of all guaranteed bonds will 
mature within two years, i.e. by the end of 2011.
Chart 8 Issued and matured senior bank 
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Sources: Dealogic and ECB calculations.
Chart 9 Issued and matured senior bank 
bonds cumulative for 1 October 2008 
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RECAPITALISATIONS
As the ﬁ  nancial turmoil persisted, write-downs 
owing to credit-rating downgrades had a severe 
impact on banks’ capital. In addition, as the 
economic environment deteriorated, banks also 
faced losses on their credit portfolios and the 
risk weights on performing assets increased, 
putting further pressure on banks’ capital 
positions. As it became clear that the banks were 
not only confronted with liquidity strains, but 
also with solvency problems, several 
governments began to complement the 
guarantees previously offered with direct capital 
injections into banks. Capital injections have 
mostly been made through the acquisition of 
preferred shares or other hybrid instruments, 
which fulﬁ  l the conditions for Tier 1 capital.30 
The focus on preference shares as the main tool 
to inject capital has been primarily driven by 
the objectives of bolstering the capital position 
of banks, while at the same time leaving bank 
ownership in the private sector and ensuring 
the priority of public sector claims. These 
objectives have been met, insofar as preference 
shares do not carry voting rights but do give 
their holders priority over ordinary shareholders 
in the payment of dividends and during 
liquidation. With regard to their inclusion 
in regulatory capital, only non-cumulative 
preferred stock can be included as an element of 
Tier 1 capital (see Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2005). Even if it can be counted 
as regulatory capital, concerns remain about 
whether raising capital through preference 
shares truly amounts to de-leveraging, given 
that this form of capital does not provide 
the same loss-absorbing feature as common 
equity.31 Also markets have increasingly 
focused on higher quality capital deﬁ  nitions, 
such as tangible common equity, which exclude 
preferred shares. This may have been one reason 
for the interest in converting preferred shares 
into ordinary shares.32 Another reason is the high 
cost attached to preferred shares (see below).
Some countries have included an option to convert preferred  30 
shares into ordinary shares, for example the Netherlands in the 
case of ING.
In the words of the Royal Bank of Scotland CEO, “preference  31 
shares are just a disguised form of leverage”.
To strengthen its capital position, Citigroup converted  32 
USD 25 billion of preferred shares into common equity at the 
end of July 2009, thereby increasing the US government’s stake 
in the bank to 34%. Before that transaction took place, almost all 
of the non-government holders of preferred shares had agreed to 
convert their holdings into common equity.
Table 2 Maturity and volume of government-guaranteed bonds issued since October 2008
Country Total  Issuance, 
billion EUR 






Austria 21.9 6  32  0.7  43.2  28
Australia 124.7 23  376  0.3  43.3  26
Belgium 2.3 3 7  0.3  36.6  13
Germany 248.5 11 60  4.1  16.7  17
Denmark 39.1 40  198  0.2  25.0  19
Spain 56.9 44  150  0.4  38.3  25
France 150.9 3  34  4.4  37.9  25
Greece 15.9 5  13  1.2  30.0  36
Ireland 70.3 13  209  0.3  20.0  4
Luxembourg 0.8 2 6  0.1  20.0  17
Netherlands 54.2 6  45  1.2  50.1  46
New Zealand 7.9  9  28  0.3  42.2  25
Portugal 5.0 7 7  0.7  40.4  21
Sweden 26.0 6  106  0.2  33.9  20
UK 163.9 14  193  0.8  30.1  19
US 234.3 43  208  1.1  33.6  22
Total/Average 1,222.8 235  1,672  0.7  34.4  22
Sources: Bloomberg and ECB calculations.
Notes: Residual Maturity as of 31 May 2010. Euro amounts based on the exchange rate prevailing on the 1 October 2008. Total for 
column 1 to 3 and average for column 4 and 5.30
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Table 1 shows that countries with recapitalisation 
schemes have typically also implemented 
guarantee schemes. While the take-up rate for 
recapitalisations is higher than for guarantees, it is 
still relatively low. Capital injections have been 
less common in the euro area than in the United 
States. Chart 10 shows that the total volume of 
US capital injections amounted to €287 billion 
at its peak in June 2009, while recapitalisations 
reached €121 billion in the euro area. Within the 
European Union, the UK government injected 
the largest volume of capital, which peaked at 
about €40 billion. A further important aspect 
is the varying level of involvement in banks 
that received capital injections. In a number 
of cases, banks became de facto nationalised, 
when governments obtained majority stakes in 
them, or were nationalised outright. As a case in 
point, the German government even organised 
a shareholder squeeze-out to take full control 
of Hypo Real Estate, after having granted more 
than €100 billion in guarantees to the bank.
With respect to the pricing of the capital 
injections, most countries in Europe appear to 
have followed the ECB’s advice and set the cost 
of their preference shares at levels that encourage 
an early exit by the banks. Typically, banks pay 
a sizeable ﬁ  xed coupon on the preferred shares. 
The coupon generally consists of three elements: 
(i) the government bond yield, as a benchmark 
for the relevant minimum risk yield and the 
government’s funding cost; (ii) a premium to 
reﬂ  ect the credit risk of the ﬁ  nancial institution 
concerned, based for example on the CDS 
spread; and (iii) a fee for the operational costs, 
in line with the recommendations of the 
Eurosystem (EC, 2009).33 In addition, besides 
an overall limit given by the commitments to a 
speciﬁ  c measure, some jurisdictions have also 
established individual limits for the support 
of banks.34
In a few cases, the initial conditions of the 
recapitalisation measures were later adjusted. 
For instance, on 17 April 2009, the US Treasury 
exchanged its USD 40 billion of cumulative 
preferred shares in AIG for non-cumulative 
ones.35 On the same day, it injected another 
USD 29.8 billion of capital, in the form of 
preferred shares, into AIG.
Given that recapitalisations aim to provide 
Tier 1 capital on a temporary basis, 
recapitalisation measures have often included 
an exit strategy. Different exit options have been 
envisaged: (i) the recapitalisation scheme may 
have an expiry date; (ii) the shares may include 
a call option allowing the bank to repurchase 
the shares at a given price after a certain period 
of time; (iii) the dividend payable on the shares 
(usually preferred shares) may be ﬁ  xed at such 
a level that banks have an incentive to buy back 
See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/recommendations_ 33 
on_pricing_for_recapitalisationsen.pdf
For example in Germany, the maximum limit for recapitalisations  34 
is set at €10 billion for individual institutions. In the United States, 
the FDIC imposed a limit on debt guaranteed under the Debt 
Guarantee Program equal to 125% of the institution’s senior 
unsecured debt.
On 17 April, the US Treasury exchanged its Series D Fixed  35 
Rate Cumulative Preferred Shares for Series E Fixed Rate 
Non-Cumulative Preferred Shares, with no change to the 
Treasury’s initial investment amount. In addition, in order 
for AIG to fully redeem the Series E Preferred Shares, it has 
an additional obligation to the Treasury of USD 1.6 billion, to 
reﬂ  ect the cumulative unpaid dividends due to the Treasury on 
the Series D Preferred Shares as of the exchange date.
Chart 10 Government capital injections 


























Occasional Paper No 117
July 2010
3   DISCUSSION OF 
SUPPORT MEASURES the shares/convert them to ordinary shares as 
soon as possible; and (iv) as in the US plan, 
a step-up clause may be included, which leads to 
an increase in the dividend rate upon the expiry 
of a certain period.
While under the ﬁ  rst option the government sets 
criteria for the redemption of the capital injected, 
the other options leave the decision to redeem 
capital to the banks. When coordinated across 
countries, the ﬁ   rst avenue has the advantage 
that redemptions follow a simultaneous pattern. 
This simultaneous approach avoids a possible 
competitive disadvantage for banks that return 
public funds while other banks still have recourse 
to public capital. However, an important caveat 
of this approach is that the timing of the exit may 
not adequately ﬁ  t the individual situation of all 
banks and may thus simply not be feasible.
The approach in the European Union is to 
provide banks with the incentive to return 
public funds promptly. In addition, uniform exit 
arrangements have been a central consideration 
under the EC’s approval process of government 
support measures to ﬁ  nancial  institutions. 
Therefore, the EC stipulates that the pricing 
conditions should be set so that it is in the banks’ 
interest to repay capital to the government as 
soon as the crisis abates while, at the same time, 
paying due regard to the market situation of 
each institution. The key incentive is given by 
a sufﬁ  ciently high entry price level. In line with 
ECB recommendations, this price consists of 
several components, among which bank-speciﬁ  c
risk-based spreads ﬁ  gure  prominently. 
The spreads are calculated on the basis of a 
pre-turmoil average. In order to reﬂ  ect  the 
under-pricing of risk in the pre-turmoil period, 
an add-on factor is included. This add-on 
factor and the risk-based spread should largely 
reduce any competitive distortions. In addition, 
the pricing also takes the level of subordination 
of the type of capital chosen into account. 
The calculation sets a pricing corridor for 
preferred shares and other hybrid instruments 
with an average of 7%, and for ordinary shares 
with an average of 9.3%. As a consequence 
of the pricing mechanism, the competitive 
distortions caused by government capital 
injections can be expected to be very limited. 
In fact, a decline in risk-based spreads below the 
level of the component used for the pricing will 
make private funding cheaper when markets 
calm further. The pricing mechanism thus 
already contains an in-built exit arrangement.
The EC also recommended step-up and 
redemption clauses to further boost incentives 
to return government funds. Step-ups have been 
implemented through an increase over time 
in the coupon payments on preferred shares. 
In the case of ING, the step-up has been linked 
to the dividend payments on ordinary shares, 
which provides an incentive to retain proﬁ  ts, 
to bolster capital and to repay government 
capital early. Redemption clauses take the form 
of a call option on the debt, which permits the 
issuer to redeem the capital at any time. Overall, 
the exit arrangements currently in place in 
the European Union aim to strike a balance 
between providing incentives for an early exit 
and paying due regard to banks’ individual 
circumstances (see Section 3.2.3 for a more 
detailed discussion).
ASSET SUPPORT
The uncertainty about the value of some classes 
of assets held by banks may have resulted in 
a reluctance to lend in the interbank market. 
The related write-downs subsequently ate 
into banks’ capital and prevented them from 
extending credit to the private sector. Therefore, 
cleaning up balance sheets became a core part 
of the rescue efforts. However, the problem of 
pricing these toxic assets correctly also made 
the task of removing them from balance sheets 
complex and difﬁ  cult. Hence, while it was also 
clear from previous banking crises that cleaning 
up balance sheets was essential to speed up the 
recovery process (for example, the Asian crisis, 
referred to in Lindgren et al., 1999), systematic 
asset support measures have only slowly become 
part of the policy tool kit. In contrast, ad hoc 
asset support measures formed part of some 
of the earliest rescue operations (for example, 32
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the Maiden Lane transaction for Bear Stearns 
and asset guarantees provided to WestLB and 
SachsenLB).
In general, asset support schemes may either 
take the form of asset removal schemes (which 
transfer the assets to a separate institution, 
such as a so-called bad bank) or asset insurance 
schemes (which keep the assets on the banks’ 
balance sheet). Based on past experience, 
the Eurosystem considered the speciﬁ  c criteria 
that determine which of these schemes is the 
preferred option. Criteria in favour of the asset 
removal model include (i) a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding the banks’ future asset 
quality; (ii) concentration of impaired assets in a 
few institutions within the ﬁ  nancial system; and 
(iii) circumstances in which a “clean break” for 
the participating institutions could be deemed 
most appropriate, despite the higher upfront 
costs. In contrast, criteria in favour of the 
asset insurance model are (i) a high incidence 
of hard-to-value assets, such as asset-backed 
securities, among the impaired assets; and 
(ii) circumstances in which consideration of the 
state of public ﬁ  nances would favour schemes 
with a cost proﬁ  le that puts less pressure on the 
government ﬁ  scal position in the short term.
However, the choice between an asset removal 
scheme and an asset insurance scheme is 
extremely challenging in a situation where the 
quality of banks’ assets is likely to deteriorate 
further. This uncertainty is probably one 
reason why many schemes combine elements 
of both types and can thus be categorised as 
hybrid schemes. Such schemes often involve 
asset transfers, ﬁ   nanced by means of public 
sector guaranteed loans, and sophisticated 
arrangements for risk-sharing between the 
governments and participating banks.
Some countries had implemented asset support 
measures even before the crisis intensiﬁ  ed  in 
October 2008. The earliest steps in this direction 
were ad hoc measures forming part of rescue 
restructurings. For instance, in the second 
quarter of 2008, the Federal Reserve System 
facilitated the merger of JP Morgan Chase and 
Bear Stearns by providing a senior loan to a bad 
bank LLC, Maiden Lane, to fund the purchase 
of a portfolio of mortgage-related securities, 
residential and commercial mortgage loans, and 
associated hedges from Bear Stearns (see also 
Appendix 1). Another example of an early ad 
hoc measure was the merger of Merrill Lynch 
and Bank of America (BofA), when the US 
government agreed to share the losses that BofA 
might incur on mortgage-related assets inherited 
from Merrill Lynch.36 However, following the 
release of the results of the Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program, the ring-fencing 
arrangement was abandoned without having 
been implemented, and BofA paid an exit fee to 
the US authorities involved in the support 
package (US Treasury, Fed, and FDIC) in 
September 2009. To deal with its largest 
ﬁ  nancial institution, the United States entered 
into a similar loss-sharing arrangement with 
Citigroup under the Asset Guarantee Program, 
which is part of the TARP and targets 
systemically important institutions.37
Recognising the need to offer asset relief to 
smaller banks too, on 23 March 2009 the US 
Treasury – in conjunction with the FDIC and 
the Federal Reserve System – launched its 
It was agreed on 16 January 2009 that BofA would assume the  36 
ﬁ  rst USD 10 billion of losses on a pool of USD 118 billion of 
toxic assets and that the United States government would assume 
the next USD 10 billion, as well as 90% of all further losses, 
with Bank of America being responsible for the remaining 10% 
of such further losses.
Under this loss-sharing arrangement, Citigroup assumes the ﬁ  rst  37 
USD 39.5 billion of losses on an asset pool of USD 301 billion, 
while the US Treasury assumes 90% of a second loss tranche 
of USD 5 billion and the FDIC 90% of the third loss tranche 
of USD 10 billion. Should even higher losses materialise, the 
Federal Reserve System would extend a non-recourse loan to 
cover the rest of the asset pool, with Citigroup being required 
to repay 10% of such losses to the Federal Reserve immediately. 
A summary of the terms of the loss sharing arrangement is 
available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2009/090116b.
pdf?ieNocache=345. The fee for the loss coverage consists 
of USD 7.059 billion of 8% cumulative perpetual preferred 
stock (USD 4.034 billion corresponding to the Treasury and 
USD 3.025 billion to the FDIC) and a warrant to the Treasury to 
purchase 66,531,728 million shares of common stock at a strike 
price of USD 10.61 per share.33
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The PPIP is a bad-bank scheme, which allows 
banks to move eligible toxic assets (loans and 
securities), or legacy assets as they are called in 
the United States, into bank-speciﬁ  c  funds. 
These funds are ﬁ  nanced in such a way that the 
public shares the risk and proﬁ  ts with private 
sector participants.39 The prices of the assets are 
determined in auctions.40 As of 24 March 2010, 
the United States Treasury had spent a total of 
about USD 30.4 billion on legacy securities 
under the PPIP, of which one third was an equity 
investment and two thirds a debt investment.41 
With regard to the legacy loans program, a pilot 
sale was conducted in August 2009. 
In Europe, the asset protection measures 
followed largely the same pattern as in the 
United States. The back-up facility for ING 
discussed in Box 1 is an example of an asset 
protection measure.
Early examples of asset guarantees in Europe 
include two German Landesbanks. SachsenLB 
received guarantees on a portfolio of securities 
of €17.5 billion. A ﬁ   rst loss tranche of up 
to €2.75 billion was guaranteed by the state 
of Saxonia and a second tranche of up to 
€6.4 billion by Landesbank Baden-Württemberg. 
This asset insurance measure contrasts with the 
asset removal transaction under which WestLB 
transferred a portfolio of assets of €23 billion to 
an SPV in March 2008 and received €5 billion 
from its owners, i.e. savings banks and the state 
of North Rhine-Westphalia. The guarantees were 
extended by another €4 billion in June 2009.
Several different, more systematic approaches 
have been set up in Europe. For instance, the UK 
authorities implemented an asset insurance 
scheme, participation in which depended on the 
outcome of stress tests conducted by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority for the three largest banks. 
While Barclays was allowed to opt out, the UK 
entered into loss sharing arrangements with 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds.42 
However, Lloyds terminated the agreement 
with the government before the arrangement 
could be implemented (see Section 3.2.3). 
On 14 April 2009, Ireland revealed its plans for a 
National Asset Management Agency (NAMA). 
NAMA began acquiring assets from the ﬁ  ve 
major Irish banks in March 2010. The book 
value of the assets was €16 billion, which were 
acquired at considerable discounts.43 NAMA 
plans to purchase a total of €81 billion of loans 
by the end of 2010. In contrast to the UK, 
the eligible assets (land and development loans) 
are removed from the balance sheets of Ireland’s 
major banks.44
Using USD 75 to 100 billion of TARP capital and capital  38 
from private investors, the PPIP is intended to generate 
USD 500 billion in purchasing power to buy toxic assets, 
with the potential to expand to USD 1 trillion over time. 
The eligible assets of each bank that wishes to participate in the 
PPIP are moved into a bank-speciﬁ  c fund.
The US Treasury and private capital provide equity ﬁ  nancing,  39 
and the FDIC provides a guarantee for debt issued by the 
Public-Private Investment Funds to fund the asset purchases. 
The Treasury provides 50% of the equity capital for each fund, 
but private managers retain control of asset management subject 
to rigorous oversight by the FDIC. To reduce the likelihood of 
the government overpaying for the assets, the price of the loans 
and securities purchased under the PPIP is established by private 
sector investors competing with one another.
One concern is that the banks selling assets are also able to bid for  40 
them. Hence, critics charge that the government’s public-private 
partnership – which provides generous loans to investors – 
is intended to help banks acquire, rather than sell, troubled 
securities and loans, using the leverage provided by the PPIP. 
The fear is that instead of helping price discovery, the PPIP 
could let banks use taxpayers’ money to make bids at above the 
current market prices for the assets. If those bids eventually turn 
out to have been too high and the cash ﬂ  ows never materialise, 
then the taxpayer will ultimately pay the bill.
The equity and debt investments may be incrementally funded.  41 
Hence, the number given represents the Treasury’s maximum 
obligation.
Under the original agreement of February 2009, RBS and  42 
Lloyds agreed to put GBP 325 and 260 billion of assets into the 
schemes, respectively. The arrangements speciﬁ  ed a ﬁ  rst loss 
tranche of GBP 42 and 25 billion, respectively, which the banks 
themselves were to bear, the government agreeing to cover 90% 
of any further losses. In November 2009 Lloyds terminated the 
agreement before it could be implemented, while the terms of 
the agreement with RBS were adjusted (the ﬁ  rst loss tranche 
was increased from GBP 42 to 60 billion and the asset pool was 
reduced from GBP 325 to 282 billion).
NAMA paid €8.5 billion for the loans, representing an average  43 
discount of 47%.
The assets will include both healthy and impaired loans, ranging  44 
from loans for undeveloped land to loans for residential and 
commercial developments. While many details are not yet 
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The German government revealed its plans for a 
bad-bank scheme in mid-May 2009, and the 
Federal Parliament approved the measures on 
2 July 2009. While the proposal foresees the 
transfer of assets into bank-speciﬁ  c SPVs, it is a 
hybrid scheme, as banks are shielded from 
losses only temporarily and ultimately have to 
bear all losses on the transferred assets 
(see Box 5 for further details). Besides this 
so-called SPV scheme, a consolidation scheme 
is also planned. This second scheme differs 
insofar as banks can transfer entire business 
areas to a liquidating institution, which will be 
supervised by SoFFin. At the time of writing, 
the SPV scheme has not been used, but a 
consolidation scheme has been set up for 
WestLB.45 
See http://www.aa1.de/. 45 
Box 5 
THE GERMAN SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE SCHEME
Under the SPV model, an institution may transfer structured securities at a reduced book value 
to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) established for the purpose (see chart below).1 The volume 
of securities that may potentially be transferred is estimated to amount to €180–190 billion. 
In return, the transferring institution receives bonds of the same value issued by the SPV and 
guaranteed by the SoFFin (Financial Market Stabilisation Fund), i.e. by the state. Thus, instead 
of volatile assets, the transferring institution has government-guaranteed bonds on its balance 
sheet, which have a lower capital requirement. The amounts payable in respect of interest and 
repayment of the bonds are serviced from the cash ﬂ  ows of the transferred securities. In return, 
the transferring institution pays a guarantee fee reﬂ  ecting the risk associated with the securities 
transferred to the government (the SoFFin).
1  This is the higher of 90% of the book value, as stated in the last audited annual accounts, or the “real economic value”. This haircut 
on the book value is subject to the condition that the transferring institution maintains a core capital ratio of at least 7%.
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(at the discounted book value of the securities)
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(book value minus haircut – usually 10%)
SPV
Securities
1) Covers the Federation in case the SPV makes a claim under the guarantee.
2) Only takes effect after the SPV has been dissolved and if the compensatory fee fails to cover any losses.35
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The transferring institution is obliged to pay a compensatory fee from the amount available for 
distribution to shareholders. This fee is equal to the difference between the discounted book 
value and the “fundamental value” of the securities and is paid in equal annual instalments over 
the life of the structured security, up to a maximum of 20 years. This payment is made to the 
SPV to compensate for expected losses arising from the purchase of the assets. The interest rate 
advantage arising from the deferred payment of the difference between the reduced book value 
and the “fundamental value” must be remunerated in the form of a market-based fee for the 
SoFFin’s guarantee.
Moreover, the original shareholders of the transferring institution remain liable for any of 
the SPV’s losses, as long as these are covered by future amounts available for distribution to 
shareholders of the transferring institution. This means that although the securities are removed 
from the transferring institutions’ balance sheets, the proﬁ  t distributable to shareholders will 
continue to be used until all the risks associated with the securities have been covered. For this 
reason, the SPV model may be considered a ‘hybrid’ asset support scheme.
Since the shareholders of the transferring institutions have to bear the full cost of the schemes 
as long as the transferring institutions exist, moral hazard and incentives to participate are 
likely to be limited. In addition, possible complexities in determining the correct value of the 
transferred securities are partially circumvented, as valuation merely affects the recipients of the 
distributable proﬁ  ts of the transferring institution. If the transferred securities are overvalued, 
the compensation fee paid over the guarantee period will be too low. The difference would then 
be paid out of future distributable proﬁ  ts, which would not be distributed to the shareholders 
but to the government. In the event of undervaluation, the opposite occurs and the shareholders 
beneﬁ  t from the SPV’s proﬁ  ts. The effect of the scheme on the federal budget and debt may be 
limited, given that upfront payments by the government are not necessary. In sum, the SPV model 
is broadly in line with the guiding principles established by the Eurosystem.2
The scheme is expected to offer two possible sources of relief for transferring institutions. 
First, the exchange of transferred securities for government-guaranteed bonds may provide 
transferring institutions with collateral that can be used to access central bank liquidity. Second, 
from a regulatory perspective, exchanging securities subject to high capital requirements for 
government-guaranteed bonds may free up capital. The provision of liquidity and the freeing up 
of capital would allow transferring institutions to continue their lending activity. Despite the 10% 
cap on the haircut, the risk is that some institutions may have limited incentives to participate in 
the scheme because of low capital buffers. However, this risk is limited by the condition that the 
transferring institution must maintain a core capital ratio of at least 7% and the haircut is only 
needed if the fundamental value is lower than the book value. In addition, potential new investors 
could be deterred from injecting capital into the transferring institution by the possibility of a 
future allocation of distributable proﬁ  ts to cover the SPV’s losses; however, this is mitigated by 
the ability of the transferring institutions to issue preferential shares which give new shareholders 
priority over the SoFFin’s claims. Since institutions are allowed to pay for potential losses by 
issuing shares to the SoFFin and this implies increased government involvement in the banking 
sector, the ECB considers that an assessment should be made of the extent of this additional 
public involvement and exit strategies formulated.
2  Guiding Principles for Bank Asset Support Schemes, issued on 25 February 2009 and available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.
europa.eu.36
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The features of asset removal schemes vary 
considerably across countries. Table 3 compares 
the features of the US, German and Irish 
schemes. For instance, the eligible asset classes 
vary widely from one scheme to another, as does 
the nature of participation, which is voluntary in 
Germany and the United States, but mandatory 
in Ireland. Furthermore, the pricing mechanisms 
differ: prices are established by auction in the 
United States, while they are determined by 
auditors in Germany and Ireland.
The potential risks are high for the public, as 
the amounts committed to asset relief measures 
are large (see Table 1). The United States and 
the United Kingdom have implemented asset 
relief schemes under which they could face 
losses of about €220 billion each. The German 
and Irish schemes could cost the taxpayer 
€190 billion and €90 billion, respectively, 
if fully implemented. These amounts account for 
a large part of the high commitments, in terms 
of GDP, in these countries. However, these 
losses would only materialise in the unlikely 
case that the underlying asset pools become 
worthless. If the assets retain part of their value, 
the ensuing loss for the public will be smaller. 
Also, if the bank that beneﬁ  ts from the asset 
relief measures also receives support in the form 
of capital and/or liability guarantees, losses for 
the taxpayer would only materialise for one side 
of the balance sheet.
Finally, in the event of the transferring institution’s insolvency and a loss on the SPV’s portfolio, 
the government would become responsible for losses on the guaranteed transferred securities. 
Consequently, the government has an incentive to avoid the insolvency of a transferring 
institution by providing further support measures. In this regard, the scheme may necessitate 
further public support measures.
Table 3 Comparison of the asset removal schemes in the United States, Germany, and Ireland
US 1) Germany 2) Ireland
Assets are moved to Public-private investment fund 
(PPIF) for each participating bank
SPV for each participating bank National Asset Management 
Agency (NAMA)
Manager Private investor Participating bank NAMA
Eligible assets Legacy loans and securities 
(estimated purchasing power of 
USD 500 billion-1,000 billion)
Structured securities (estimated 
exposure of €180-190 billion)
Loans secured on development 
land and property under 
development; property-backed 
exposures (estimated exposure 
of €80-90 billion)
Participation Voluntary 3) Voluntary Mandatory
Pricing Auction Auditors (see Box 5 for details) Auditors
Assets are exchanged for Cash, as assets are sold to the 
funds
Government-guaranteed bonds 
issued by the SPV
Government bonds
Length Maturity of transferred assets Maturity of transferred securities 
(maximum 20 years)
Maturity of transferred loans
Loss sharing The PPIFs are ﬁ  nanced in such 
a way that the public shares risk 
and proﬁ  ts with the private sector 
participants: the US Treasury and 
private capital provides equity 
ﬁ  nancing, and the FDIC provides 
a guarantee for debt issued by the 
PPIFs to fund the asset purchases.
Banks ultimately bear all losses. At the time of transferral, 
banks bear a loss amounting to the 
difference between the book value 
and the assessed value. However, 
if NAMA ultimately makes a loss, 
the Irish Government intends that 
a levy should be applied to recoup 
the shortfall.
1) Public-Private Investment Program.
2) SPV scheme.
3) While participation in the PPIP is in principle voluntary, the FDIC has hinted that authorities might put pressure on banks to sell assets 
if the scheme does not take off as planned.37
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Partly on account of the strains on future ﬁ  scal 
positions, a debate has started on exit strategies 
from public support measures. This debate is 
currently being conducted simultaneously at the 
global and the EU level (see Box 6). However, 
the discussion of exit strategies should not be 
confused with their implementation. At the 
current juncture, strains on the ﬁ  nancial sector 
have alleviated, but the sustainability of the 
improvement in the ﬁ   nancial stability outlook 
could remain partly reliant on existing support 
measures. Until the recovery proves to be ﬁ  rmly 
established, especially as regards private sector 
investment and job creation, the risk of setbacks 
in the improvement of private sector earnings 
and income prospects remains signiﬁ  cant. 
The possibility cannot be ruled out, therefore, of 
a premature or disorderly exit from the existing 
public sector support measures triggering further 
ﬁ   nancial instability. In particular, if the 
sustainability of public ﬁ  nances were to be called 
into question before the recovery proves to be 
self-sustaining, an adverse trade-off could emerge 
between further deterioration of public sector 
ﬁ  nances and the potential for a renewed episode 
of ﬁ  nancial instability. It should be added that the 
progressive intensiﬁ   cation of market concerns 
about sovereign credit risks within the euro area 
in April and in early May 2010 also put pressure 
on the operating environment of banks. In some 
countries, these developments led to an 
increase in government support rather than its 
withdrawal.46 At the same time, there are also 
risks associated with late exits. These include the 
risk of creating excessive strains on public 
ﬁ   nances, distorting competition and creating 
moral hazard that comes with downside 
protection – including the possibility of 
encouraging excessive risk-taking. However, a 
premature exit could also increase moral hazard 
concerns because of the potential signal that the 
public is willing to share losses without beneﬁ  ting 
from gains. The right timing will thus be crucial 
for a successful exit. Exit strategies will also need 
to be coordinated, preferably at the global level, 
in order to avoid negative cross-border spillover 
effects. However, any exit could be complicated 
by the fact that a sub-set of institutions have 
become relatively more reliant on support than 
others. To mitigate this problem, it would be 
useful if credible alternative schemes to deal with 
such institutions, including asset support 
measures, were put in place before any exit. 
The following sub-sections focus on speciﬁ  c 
aspects related to individual measures.
As part of the economic stabilisation programme in Greece,  46 
a Financial Stability Fund will be established with the task 
to provide capital support to banks. In addition, the Greek 
government introduced a facility which guarantees up to 
€15 billion of new loans with up to 3 years and up to €8 billion 
of lending to banks of special zero coupon bonds of the Greek 
state (see IMF 2009d).
Box 6
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF EXIT
At the global level, the FSB (as requested by G20 Leaders) compiled a note on exit strategies 
from ﬁ  nancial system support measures to be used as a basis for discussion. The main elements 
of the note included the following:
Improved market conditions have led to a decline in the usage of public support, thereby  • 
reducing the need for system-wide measures.
Exits should (i) be pre-announced, ﬂ  exible, transparent, and credible; (ii) be sustainable from  • 
a prudential perspective and not compromise the supply of credit; (iii) be market-based; 
and (iv) take into account potential cross-border impacts. 38
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EXIT FROM ENHANCED DEPOSIT INSURANCE
In the European Union, the discussion on 
exit from deposit guarantees revolves around 
a coordinated reform of deposit insurance 
schemes, which would in essence consist of an 
increase in the insurance limits, but also faster 
payouts in the event of insolvency. Table 1 
shows that insurance ceilings have been raised 
and, in a number of countries, unlimited deposit 
insurance has been granted. A speciﬁ  c deadline 
for ending unlimited deposit insurance has 
not been discussed so far. With regard to the 
United States, the current deposit insurance 
limit of USD 250,000 per depositor will expire 
at the end of 2013 and will then be reduced to 
USD 100,000. 
EXIT FROM GUARANTEES ON BANK BONDS
The potential for a market-based exit is built into 
schemes with a ﬁ  xed price for the government 
guarantee: improving market conditions raise 
the price of issuing government-guaranteed 
bonds relative to non-guaranteed bonds. 
The market-based exit could be sped up by 
increasing the current prices. To this end, in the 
EU, for the extension of a guarantee scheme 
beyond 30 June 2010 to be approved by the 
European Commission, the fee for a government 
guarantee is required to be higher than under the 
pricing formula recommended by the ECB in 
October 2008.
Examining the data, it seems that euro area 
banks had already started to replace the 
issuance of guaranteed bonds by the issuance 
of non-guaranteed ones, as the issuance 
of government-guaranteed bonds declined 
signiﬁ   cantly in summer and autumn 2009, 
while the issuance of non-guaranteed bonds 
revived (see Chart 8). In 2010 however,
 the issuance of guaranteed bonds has increased 
again owing to the renewed ﬁ  nancial  market 
tensions. Hence, it is too early to draw the 
general conclusion that banks have started to 
regain access to funding markets: while some 
banks may have started to regain access to 
funding markets, others may still face strong 
challenges.
The spectrum of coordination ranges from prior notiﬁ  cation of plans (the weakest form  • 
of coordination), via discussion of the broad principles underpinning exit decisions, 
to the implementation of consistent frameworks. The potential beneﬁ  ts from coordination 
of exit decisions are highest for countries with signiﬁ   cant cross-border spillovers. 
The optimum timing of exit will vary across countries given that the strength and robustness 
of national ﬁ  nancial systems differ.
At the EU level, the debate is coordinated by the EFC/EC. While being very similar to the one at 
the global level, the debate has already advanced to more concrete questions. Given the highly 
integrated ﬁ  nancial system in the European Union, there is agreement to coordinate exit among 
national authorities. However, this does not necessarily entail the synchronised implementation of 
exit. Furthermore, as regards sequencing, guarantee schemes should be phased out ﬁ  rst, followed 
by recapitalisation measures and, ﬁ  nally, asset relief schemes. In particular, the pricing of debt 
guarantees are to be gradually tightened, as a way of providing incentives for exit. To this end, 
the European Commission in cooperation with the ECB prepared recommendations on this issue. 
Accordingly, the approval of the extension of a guarantee scheme beyond 30 June 2010 requires 
the fee for a government guarantee to be higher than under the pricing formula recommended by 
the ECB in October 2008.1
In general, there seems to be a preference for a market-based exit, with ﬁ  nancial institutions 
deciding themselves when to withdraw from government support.
1  The recommendations are available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/phase_out_bank_guarantees.pdf.39
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SUPPORT MEASURES In October 2009, the largest issuer of 
government-guaranteed bonds, the French 
agency SFEF, ceased issuing such bonds. 
Overall, €80 billion of guaranteed bonds issued 
by SFEF are currently outstanding. In the 
United States, the debt guarantee program was 
extended by six months until the end of 
October 2009. At the time, the fees were raised 
for debt issued after 1 April 2009 and for debt 
with a maturity beyond 30 June 2012.47 
This effectively, initiated the exit from the debt 
guarantee program. The program has been 
succeeded by a six-month emergency guarantee 
facility, which will expire at the end of 
April 2010. The fee for debt issued under the 
emergency facility amounts to at least 300 basis 
points, but can be raised depending on the risks 
associated with the issuing entity. 
EXIT FROM RECAPITALISATIONS
From a broad perspective, there are two 
approaches for the exit from government 
recapitalisations. First, the government sells 
its stake to the private market. This has 
occurred in only two cases so far. The Swiss 
government sold its €4 billion stake in UBS 
to institutional investors in August 2009, and 
the US government sold part of the stocks 
acquired in Citigroup in May 2010. Second, the 
bank repays the government. There are several 
alternative and typically complementary options 
available to raise capital in order to return 
the government capital. The main strategy, 
observed during the recent French initiatives 
(see below) but also during the ﬁ  rst European 
repayments by Lloyds TSB and ING, is to raise 
capital in private markets. This strategy has 
been complemented by retaining earnings, the 
sale of business units, deleveraging, and also 
by converting Tier 2-type capital of private 
investors into ordinary shares.
While the exit from guarantee schemes is 
currently being discussed, the exit from 
recapitalisation has already started. Chart 12 
shows the amount of capital repaid in Europe 
and the United States. Clearly, US banks have 
led the way by returning capital as early as end 
of March 2009. The total amount repaid so far by 
US banks is €54 billion, which represents 16% 
of capital injected. Initially, mostly smaller US 
banks started repaying government capital. Only 
after the outcome of the stress tests undertaken 
by the US authorities did larger banks receive 
permission to reimburse the US Treasury, 
which explains the repayment wave observed in 
June 2009.
As regards Europe, Lloyds TSB was the ﬁ  rst 
bank to issue new shares to raise the necessary 
capital to return €4.4 billion to the government 
in June 2009. This was followed by the sale 
of €4 billion of UBS shares held by the Swiss 
government in August 2009. Recently, several 
French banks announced their intention to 
repay the capital injections received from the 
government. BNP Paribas, Société Générale, 
Crédit Agricole and Crédit Mutuel all returned 
the capital received from the government at 
the end of October 2009. These repayments 
amount to more than half of the total amount 
of public capital injected in banks in France. 
The initiative of the French banks has paved the 
See http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/faq.html 47 
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way for other euro area banks. In Greece, Alpha 
Bank announced that it would follow suit and 
was planning to prepare a rights issue to repay 
€0.95 billion of government capital. These 
events highlight that exit from government 
schemes is now also under way in Europe.
Two factors seem to determine which banks 
repay early. First, banks that were forced to 
accept capital injections tend to repay faster. 
Capital injections were imposed on several 
large US banks which would otherwise 
not have applied for government support. 
Similarly, the French government made the 
ﬁ  rst capital tranche for banks obligatory, and 
several banks opted out when they were later 
offered a second tranche. Chart 10 shows that 
while US banks were the ﬁ  rst to return capital, 
the US injections took place considerably later 
than in Europe. This implies that the period of 
government support was considerably shorter 
for some of the largest US banks than for 
European banks.
Apart from when capital injections have been 
obligatory, early repayment is also more likely 
in the case of well-performing banks. Favourable 
earnings facilitate the raising of new capital in 
the market and the retaining of earnings to repay 
government support. Charts 13 and 14 show that 
banks with an above-median stock market 
performance often did not need capital injections 
in the ﬁ  rst place. However, if they did receive 
them, they have tended to return capital faster. 
Striking exceptions to that rule are UBS and 
Lloyds TSB, which underperformed their peers 
in terms of their stock prices. In the case of 
UBS, the government triggered the exit by 
selling its stake to an investor, realising a 
substantial return on its investment.48 UBS itself 
might not have repaid at the time, as its 
depressed stock price might not have adequately 
The Swiss government converted a note that gave it a 9.3% UBS  48 
stake and immediately sold the 332.2 million shares at 16.50 Swiss 
francs each, a 1.4% discount on the stock’s closing price on the day 
before the transaction. However, the deal generated a net return of 
more than 30% over a period of around eight months.
Chart 12 Stock prices for euro area large and complex banking groups
(as of November 2009)
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compensated its shareholders for the dilution of 
ownership. The reason why Lloyds TSB 
returned government capital is likely to have 
been the demand by the EC for it to shed 
business areas, something that Lloyds wished 
to avoid.
Overall, recent events seem to suggest that 
the incentives set by governments to induce 
early repayment have been effective for 
well-performing banks. It should be clear 
that an early exit is generally possible for 
those banks that have been less affected by 
the  ﬁ   nancial crisis or that have managed 
to achieve a quick turnaround. However, 
the remaining banks with government support 
will  ﬁ   nd it substantially harder to reimburse 
the government. In fact, the incentive to repay 
early may prove largely ineffective for banks 
that cannot raise capital in private markets or 
retain earnings. For these banks, the options to 
seek repayment are more limited and may rather 
require deleveraging and/or the sale of business 
units. Ultimately, repayment from these banks 
will need considerably more time. It should 
also be noted that banks that ﬁ  nance repayment 
by deleveraging may reduce their lending 
activities, thereby potentially contributing to 
credit constraints for the real economy.
In addition, the Swiss example shows that 
governments can also pursue exit proactively 
through the sale of their stakes. However, 
this requires a sufﬁ   cient increase in stock 
prices to protect the taxpayers’ interest and 
markets that are capable of absorbing the large 
government stakes.
EXIT FROM ASSET SUPPORT
Most of the asset support has been granted 
through ad hoc measures tailored to individual 
institutions. Schemes are rare and have only 
Chart 13 Stock prices for global large and complex banking groups 
(as of November 2009)
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been set up recently (Ireland, Germany, 
United States). They normally specify an 
enrolment window during which eligible 
ﬁ   nancial institutions can sign up. After the 
enrolment window has passed, the scheme is 
closed and cannot be accessed any more. 
As asset support is granted for the life of the 
underlying assets, asset support measures are 
generally self-liquidating. It should be noted, 
however, that owing to the long maturity of 
the underlying assets, asset support measures 
will be in place for a considerable time in 
the future.
In principle, asset support measures can be 
terminated prior to the maturity of the underlying 
assets. In the case of asset removal measures, 
the asset manager – be it a private investor 
(e.g. under the PPIP in the United States) or 
a public agency (e.g. the NAMA in Ireland) – 
can sell the assets when market prices improve. 
In the case of asset insurance measures, where 
the assets are ring-fenced and stay on the 
ﬁ  nancial institution’s balance sheet, the ﬁ  nancial 
institution could terminate the guarantee 
arrangement. An early exit of this kind has 
not been observed so far, as the measures have 
only been recently introduced. What has been 
observed, however, is the withdrawal by some 
banks from measures that have been announced, 
but not yet implemented. In the United States, 
following the release of the results of the 
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program, BofA 
announced that it did not plan to move forward 
with the asset insurance measure agreed earlier 
with the US Treasury, the Fed, and the FDIC. 
Hence, the ring-fencing arrangement was 
abandoned without having been implemented, 
and BofA paid an exit fee of USD 425 billion 
to the authorities involved in September 2009 
in return for the implicit protection already 
provided since the announcement of the asset 
insurance agreement. In the UK, Lloyds 
exited in November 2009 from its March 2009 
agreement with the government to share losses 
on a GBP 260 billion pool of assets as, owing to 
improved market conditions, it was able to raise 
enough capital to cover the potential losses on 
its portfolio. Lloyds paid the government an exit 
fee of GBP 2.5 billion.
In sum, exit from asset support is less complex 
than entry. However, it is not yet present in 
the current policy debate, as the asset support 
measures have only recently been introduced or 
are currently still being put in place.43
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The unparalleled nature of the response to 
the  ﬁ   nancial crisis discussed so far makes 
an assessment clearly desirable. Since the 
counterfactual is unobservable and the 
implementation process is still ongoing, the 
effectiveness of the measures taken is difﬁ  cult to 
judge with precision at this stage. Acknowledging 
these limitations, this section nevertheless 
offers a preliminary assessment of the 
effectiveness of the measures. This assessment 
is made with reference to the objectives stated 
in the declaration of the emergency summit 
of euro area heads of government in Paris on 
12 October 2008, i.e. (i) safeguarding ﬁ  nancial 
stability; (ii) promoting a timely return to normal 
market conditions; (iii) restoring the provision of 
credit and lending to the economy; (iv) restoring 
the long-term viability of the banking sector; 
and (v) containing the impact on public ﬁ  nances 
and preserving taxpayers’ interests.
4.1  SAFEGUARDING FINANCIAL STABILITY AND 
PROMOTING A TIMELY RETURN TO NORMAL 
MARKET CONDITIONS
The measures were successful in averting a 
further escalation of the crisis in late 2008. 
Initial empirical evidence suggests that 
government support measures have been 
effective in reducing banks’ default risk, 
which is reﬂ  ected by patterns in CDS spreads 
(see Bank for International Settlements, 2009). 
More speciﬁ  cally, capital injections seem to have 
been more effective than debt guarantees and 
asset purchases in reducing banks’ CDS spreads. 
However, the elevated levels of interbank money 
market spreads and banks’ CDS spreads, as 
well as the depressed level of bank stock prices 
reﬂ  ect continued pessimistic investor sentiment 
towards the banking sector (see Charts 15 
and 16). While the positive developments in 
these indicators since March 2009 indicated a 
cautious return of conﬁ  dence in the market, the 
increase in CDS spreads and decrease in stock 
prices since April 2010 reﬂ   ect the renewed 
ﬁ   nancial market tensions owing to sovereign 
risk concerns. Similarly, after the three-month 
euro and dollar LIBOR spreads over market 
overnight interest rates, a measure of credit 
risk, had fallen to their lowest levels since the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
they have slightly ticked up since April 2010 
(see Chart 17).
Moreover, the ﬁ   nancial rescue measures 
appear to have led to signiﬁ  cant cross-border 
spillovers (see International Monetary Fund, 
Chart 14 CDS spreads of large and complex 
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Chart 15 Stock prices of large and complex 
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2009c). Particularly after the default of 
Lehman Brothers, policy announcements of 
support measures in the United States can 
be seen to have had a positive effect on, inter 
alia, the euro area, once ﬁ  nancial  conditions 
had stabilised.
The extraordinary measures adopted by central 
banks have eased the pressure in the money 
market, but they have not fully resolved it 
(see CGFS, 2008). Given that the tensions in the 
money market are a symptom of a wider systemic 
weakness, this is unsurprising. As Taylor (2009) 
points out, central bank operations to address the 
tensions in the money market can only be fully 
successful when their cause is liquidity concerns, 
not when the underlying concern is counterparty 
credit risk. Given that at least part of the term 
spread was due to liquidity concerns, central 
bank action is an important element in the return 
to normal market conditions. From a more 
general perspective, the provision of liquidity 
has ensured that banks’ funding constraints and 
perceived liquidity and counterparty risks have 
not resulted in a collapse of the system.
Yet, while successful in the short run, there is 
a risk that such measures may have potentially 
harmful effects on ﬁ   nancial stability in the 
longer run because of adverse incentive effects 
(see Section 4.3 below). In addition, the IMF 
loss ﬁ  gures published in the April 2010 Global 
Financial Stability Report and the ECB loss 
estimates contained in the June 2010 Financial 
Stability Review suggest that banks on both 
sides of the Atlantic will face additional 
write-downs on their securities portfolios and, 
increasingly, on their loan books owing to the 
severe downturn in the real economy. Hence, 
the detrimental solvency-liquidity spiral may 
persist: as asset prices tumble and loan quality 
deteriorates, banks face further write-downs, 
which reduce 
capital. With every twist of this spiral, more 
capital is burned and government capital 
injections may prove to be fruitless (see de 
Grauwe, 2008). So far, banks have been 
successful in matching write-downs with capital 
increases (see Chart 18). Yet, the struggle to 
raise capital and to decrease leverage may leave 
little scope for extending new loans to the real 
economy. If this supply-side effect is more 
pronounced than the contracting loan demand, 
adverse feedback effects may further depress 
real economic activity (see Section 4.2 below).
Chart 16 Spread between the Euribor and 
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Chart 17 Capital raised versus losses
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4.2  RESTORING THE PROVISION OF CREDIT 
AND LENDING TO THE ECONOMY
The impact of the measures on the provision 
of credit to the non-ﬁ   nancial sector is more 
difﬁ  cult to assess, particularly when it comes 
to separating possible credit supply restrictions 
from the observed decline in the demand for 
loans. Credit continued to grow for several 
months into the crisis, albeit on a downward 
trend. However, the latest ﬁ   gures show that 
outstanding credit is contracting both in Europe 
and in the United States: Charts 19 and 20 show 
that, starting in the last quarter of 2008, annual 
growth of credit to the private sector has sharply 
decreased and monthly ﬂ  ows of credit have even 
turned negative, both in the euro area and in the 
United States.
Bank lending surveys (BLSs) complement this 
picture on lending with information on lending 
conditions. The euro area BLS, conducted by 
the ECB, shows that both credit demand and 
credit supply factor are behind the decline in 
credit growth. Banks have tightened credit 
standards signiﬁ   cantly since the onset of the 
crisis mostly in reaction to the deteriorating 
economic outlook. Yet, with the exception of 
loans to households for house purchase, since 
April 2009, euro area BLS results have shown 
that the speed with which banks tightened their 
credit standards have abated, compared with 
the second half of 2008. The most important 
driving forces for the net tightening in the euro 
area continued to be expectations regarding 
general economic activity and the industry 
or  ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ   c outlook. With respect to the 
bank-speciﬁ   c factors, the picture remained 
mixed. While banks’ liquidity position continued 
to contribute to an easing of credit standards, 
the cost of their capital position and their ability 
to access market ﬁ   nancing contributed to a 
tightening of credit standards. Therefore, bank 
balance sheet constraints are seen as a key factor 
weighing on the supply of bank credit.
Hence, the euro area BLS results point to 
persistently hampered access to wholesale 
funding of banks despite government support, 
although it has started to become less hampered. 
Banks reported that their access to wholesale 
funding had eased in response to governments’ 
announcements and the introduction of 
recapitalisations and guarantees, although it 
Chart 18 Loan growth in the euro area
(annual percentage changes and monthly ﬂ  ows; seasonally and 
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Chart 19 Loan growth in the United States
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continued to be hampered. As regards access to 
funding in the money market, a majority of banks 
reported that market access, in particular to the 
very short-term money market, was unrestricted. 
At the same time, there was little improvement in 
the access to securitisation. Finally, several banks 
responded that the ﬁ  nancial turmoil increased the 
costs related to their capital position and had an 
impact on their lending policy.
Some countries have made government support 
conditional on banks’ commitment to lend to 
the private sector. The UK BLS showed that 
such conditions were successful: net tightening 
dropped to zero as banks were forced to loosen 
their standards owing to the binding lending 
commitments attached to government support.49
However, such requirements for banks to 
support domestic lending activity may have 
undesired incentive effects: banks may withdraw 
funds from their foreign subsidiaries to support 
their domestic business. This may have potential 
systemic consequences at the global level and 
lead to banks’ withdrawing from cross-border 
lending. In addition, the pressure to convert 
the proceeds of capital injections into further 
lending increases leverage for shareholders. This 
ultimately leads to a risk of further losses and 
write-downs when the economy deteriorates.
4.3  RESTORING THE LONG-TERM VIABILITY OF 
THE BANKING SECTOR
Public interventions risk distorting competition 
and, possibly even more importantly, incentives, 
by rewarding bad behaviour ex post. For instance, 
while increased deposit insurance appears to 
have played a role in quelling depositor fears 
and thus in limiting the extent of the crisis, the 
longer-term issues concerning deposit insurance 
and particularly blanket guarantees should 
not be ignored. The literature has shown that 
more generous deposit insurance increases the 
likelihood of future crises (see Barth et al., 2001 
and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2000).
In order to contain moral hazard in the future, 
governments have therefore been careful to limit 
public support to illiquid, but solvent and viable 
institutions. It must be stated, however, that 
assessing the long-term viability of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions during a systemic crisis is a complex 
and difﬁ   cult task and, in most cases, rapid 
decisions were required to avert the collapse of 
single institutions which threatened the stability 
of the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole.50 A further 
measure that has been proposed to limit moral 
hazard is the replacement of the incumbent 
management. This is also an issue in the ongoing 
crisis, given that the management of numerous 
government-supported banks have remained in 
their positions.
Another critical issue that must be addressed 
to avoid repetition of the current crisis is the 
regulation and supervision of large and complex 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. A speciﬁ  c characteristic of 
the ongoing crisis is that it is primarily a crisis 
of large ﬁ   nancial institutions. The systemic 
threat posed by such banks has made public 
support necessary to safeguard the stability 
of the ﬁ  nancial system. However, the order of 
magnitude of these measures, highlighted in 
Table 1, points to a new challenge for ensuring 
ﬁ   nancial stability. A number of banks have 
already reached a size at which government 
support is no longer a viable option. The failure 
of the Icelandic banks has shown that institutions 
can reach a size that overwhelms a government’s 
support capabilities. As a consequence, 
declarations of no support in the future for such 
institutions may lack credibility and concerns 
about a time inconsistency problem will become 
more serious (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977). 
In order to address the moral hazard issues 
that may arise, they need to be explicitly 
Political pressure on UK banks to step up lending, in particular  49 
to small enterprises, has been mounting. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Alistair Darling, met with the CEOs of Royal Bank 
of Scotland and Barclays to discuss their lending practices at the 
end of July 2009. The Chancellor said that he was “extremely 
concerned about what the banks are doing for small companies”.
In this vein, the IMF recommends in its April 2009 GFSR that  50 
supervisors who are in the process of evaluating the viability of 
banks look into a whole range of aspects, such as write-downs 
and available capital, funding structures, business plans and risk 
management processes, the appropriateness of compensation 
policies and the strength of management.47
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addressed. Current proposals in academic and 
policy circles comprise a wide array of ideas 
that are potentially complementary. First, 
calls for capital and liquidity surcharges for 
systemically relevant institutions have been 
voiced. Second, a further proposal aims to limit 
the size of banks by restructuring large ones, in 
order to downsize them by shedding non-viable 
business lines. Third, the need for an orderly 
mechanism to close and wind down large banks 
and for enhanced early intervention has been 
recognised. More speciﬁ  cally, this has become 
an issue in the United States, where the prompt 
corrective action (PCA) mechanism could not be 
equally applied to large and complex ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries without causing damage to the 
ﬁ   nancial system. Fourth, measures to reduce 
the interconnectedness of such players through 
market infrastructure (e.g. the establishment of 
central counterparties) have been called for.
Finally, from the perspective of ﬁ  nancial 
supervision, a holistic view of the ﬁ  nancial 
system as a whole (so-called “macro-prudential 
supervision”) is warranted. Supervisory 
institutions have increasingly become 
aware that the monitoring of system-wide 
developments, alongside the supervision of 
individual institutions, has become paramount. 
In addition, the crisis, and more speciﬁ  cally 
the failure of some large banks that had been 
active across several European borders, has 
underlined the importance of enhancing 
cross-border cooperation, both for micro and 
macro-prudential supervision.
4.4  THE IMPACT ON PUBLIC FINANCES 
AND THE PUBLIC COST
The various measures in support of the ﬁ  nancial 
system are exerting considerable pressure on 
public  ﬁ   nances. According to IMF (2009b) 
estimates, the immediate impact averages 5.75% 
of GDP for the G-20 countries and may rise 
when taking into account central bank liquidity 
provisions and guarantees, which do not require 
upfront ﬁ  nancing. At the same time, calculating 
the direct costs of the crisis is challenging. For 
example, the US Treasury has received 
substantial dividend payments on the capital 
injections made under the TARP. However, if 
banks that have received capital injections were 
to default, the losses would probably be high, 
potentially amounting to the full investment 
made, despite the seniority of preference 
shares.51 In May 2010, the US Treasury 
estimated that total projected lifetime costs of 
TARP will be USD 105.4 billion. 
The proﬁ  tability of the different measures taken 
by the US Federal Reserve System varies 
greatly. The investments in GSE securities and 
in MBSs guaranteed by GSEs have contributed 
to the interest income of SOMA. In addition, the 
loan programs (TAF, TALF, AMLF, PDCF and 
the credit line to AIG) have earned 
USD 3.4 billion of interest income from January 
2009 until March 2010. The outcome with 
respect to the consolidated LLCs is similar: the 
Fed has earned USD 4.4 billion on the CPFF 
and USD 4 billion on the Maiden Lane LLCs.52
Costs may also emerge indirectly through an 
increase in sovereign borrowing costs. It should 
be noted that banks bear part of the cost, for 
example through increased fees to rebuild 
deposit insurance funds. Box 7 discusses 
the costs of failed FDIC-insured banks and 
compares the developments of the current crisis 
with the savings and loan crisis.
The various measures taken to support the 
ﬁ  nancial sector are expected to have a limited 
direct impact on government deﬁ  cits in the short 
to medium term. The impact on government 
The Treasury has already conﬁ   rmed that it lost its full  51 
USD 2.3 billion investment in CIT when CIT defaulted. This 
was be the ﬁ  rst loss to arise from TARP.
These estimates are taken from the Federal Reserve System  52 
Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the 
Balance Sheet published in June 2010. Proﬁ  t and losses refer to 
the period from the inception of the facilities until the end of the 
ﬁ  rst quarter of 2010.48
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debt largely depends on the government 
borrowing that is required to ﬁ  nance the rescue 
operations.53 Potential ﬁ  scal risks are sizeable 
for all countries that have established a guarantee 
scheme, as it may negatively affect market 
perceptions of their creditworthiness. 
In addition, the economic downturn and the 
sizeable ﬁ  scal packages adopted to counter the 
recession aggravate the overall impact on public 
debt.54 Given the size of the commitments 
assumed during the current crisis, the credibility 
of the guarantees may be called into question if 
governments become unable or unwilling to pay 
(see Hoggarth and Reidhill, 2003). In fact, partly 
as a result of the substantial government 
guarantee, rating agencies have downgraded a 
number of euro area countries (e.g. Ireland). 
Recapitalisations of banks and other ﬁ  nancial  institutions  53 
through purchases of new equity at market prices are recorded 
as ﬁ  nancial transactions without any (immediate) impact on the 
government deﬁ   cit/surplus. Recapitalisations, loans and asset 
purchases increase government debt if the government has to 
borrow to ﬁ  nance these operations. Government securities lent or 
swapped without cash collateral in temporary liquidity schemes 
are not counted as government debt; neither are government 
guarantees, which are contingent liabilities in national accounts. 
Interest and dividend payments, as well as fees received for 
securities lent and guarantees provided, improve the government 
budget balance. More details of the statistical recording of public 
interventions to support the ﬁ   nancial sector are provided in 
Box 1 in A. van Riet (editor), “Euro area ﬁ  scal policies and the 
crisis”, ECB Occasional Paper No. 109, April 2010.
The support measures had adverse impacts on the public debt  54 
positions of a number of euro area countries. That said, for 
the euro area as a whole, the government support of ﬁ  nancial 
sectors was not the most important source of enlarged ﬁ  scal 
imbalances. The main reason for the severe deterioration of 
public ﬁ  nances was the activation of automatic stabilisers – that 
is the loss of tax revenue and higher government expenditure 
outlays that ordinarily results from weaker economic activity – 
as a consequence of the marked contraction of economic activity 
that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Because the 
structural ﬁ  scal imbalances of a number of euro area countries 
were sizeable before the ﬁ  nancial crisis erupted, ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits 
in those countries expanded to very high levels. Added to 
this were the discretionary ﬁ   scal measures taken by many 
countries to stimulate their economies following the agreement 
in December 2008 of the European Economic Recovery Plan. 
This  ﬁ   scal stimulus came close to matching the impact on 
deﬁ  cits of automatic stabilisers. More information on the impact 
of the ﬁ  nancial crisis on ﬁ  scal positions is provided in A. van 
Riet (editor), “Euro area ﬁ   scal policies and the crisis”, ECB 
Occasional Paper No. 109, April 2010.49
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THE COST OF FAILED BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES
The number of failed US banks has soared since the onset of the ongoing ﬁ  nancial crisis. Despite 
the sizeable US government measures in support of the banking system, the number of failed US 
banks has risen from only 3 banks in 2007 to 140 in 2009. The upper chart shows the number 
of US banks that have failed or received assistance since 1979 and the assets and deposits 
of these institutions. From a historical perspective, the number of institutions that failed during 
the savings and loan (S&L) crisis during the 1980s dwarfs all other episodes of banking sector 
stress. Between 1980 and 1994, more than 1,600 banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) were closed or received FDIC ﬁ  nancial assistance. The overall cost of the 
S&L crisis is estimated to have been about USD 153 billion, of which USD 124 billion (81%) was 
borne by the public sector.1 The chart to the right also shows the volume of deposits and assets 
of failed US banks. During the S&L crisis, the assets of assisted and failed banks climbed to over 
USD 200 billion at its peak in 1989.2 In comparison, in 2009 the assets of assisted and failed 
banks reached over USD 1.6 trillion owing to the failure/assistance of a few very large banks.3 
The relative size of failing banks is a key difference between the S&L crisis and the current 
crisis. While the S&L crisis was primarily a systemic crisis involving many smaller banks, the 
current crisis has been characterised by the failure of large and systemically relevant banks. 
The median size of failed and assisted banks, based on their deposits between 1986 and 1995, 
was USD 0.08 billion, but reached USD 0.25 billion in the period from 2007 to date.
1  See T. Curry and L. Shibut (2000), “The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences”, FDIC Banking Review 
Vol. 13, No.2.
2  Data on assets, deposits and losses are calculated in constant USD with base year 2000. A GDP price index was used to deﬂ  ate 
the series.
3  The two largest banks involved were Citibank, which received assistance, and Washington Mutual.
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A more important aspect is the size of the losses associated with the two crises. As mentioned 
above, the total cost of the S&L crisis amounted to USD 153 billion. The lower chart shows that 
losses peaked at USD 68 billion in 1989 and gradually declined thereafter. At the same time, the 
median loss per bank incurred by the FDIC reached USD 0.02 billion. With regard to the current 
crisis, data on losses for 2008 reveals a rise in the median loss to about USD 0.13 billion per failed 
bank. Given the sharp increase in assets and deposits of failed banks, losses can be expected to 
rise signiﬁ  cantly in subsequent years. The FDIC estimates that the costs of failed and assisted 
banks will amount to USD 100 billion by the end of 2013. As a consequence of the already 
depleted resources of the deposit insurance fund, the FDIC ordered banks to prepay insurance 
premiums amounting to USD 45 billion by December 2009. This prepayment represents an 
additional burden to banks which reduces their liquidity and the funds available for lending.
Finally, with regard to the EU, data on failed institutions and the associated costs across countries 
is scarce. Typically, large EU banks have been rescued by governments and, in a few instances, 
sold off to other ﬁ  nancial institutions. In the few cases for which data have been published, the 
amounts are already sizeable. Yet, considerable uncertainty remains regarding the eventual cost 
of the support measures adopted.
While a direct extrapolation of the ultimate costs of the current crisis to the EU taxpayer is not 
prudent, given the different origins of the two crises, comparison with the savings and loan crisis 
may provide an indication of the order of magnitude of the overall cost.51
ECB
Occasional Paper No 117
July 2010
5   CONCLUSION 
AND OUTLOOK 5  CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
A key issue for the management of the crisis has 
been the extensive public support measures for 
the ﬁ  nancial sector. This paper gives a detailed 
description of the measures central banks and 
governments have used in the EU and the United 
States. In addition, this paper presents a ﬁ  rst 
attempt to shed some light on the effectiveness 
of these measures.
As regards the measures used, the crisis 
responses in the United States have been largely 
similar to those in the EU. First, they have 
employed broadly the same tools (government 
guarantees, capital and liquidity injections and 
asset protection). Second, apart from their scope, 
they have also been similar in size: the amounts 
committed by the US Treasury and the FDIC in 
support of the ﬁ  nancial sector represent 26% of 
GDP in the United States, which compares with 
26% in the European Union and 28% in the euro 
area.55 Like the EU, the United States has relied 
on a mix of ad hoc measures for individual 
institutions and schemes addressing the wider 
needs of the ﬁ  nancial system. Also, monetary 
policy actions and bank rescue measures have 
been becoming more and more intertwined 
(examples of this being the asset purchase 
program in the UK and the collateral 
requirements of the Eurosystem).
However, there are also important differences. 
For example, the Federal Reserve System has 
been more expansive and has also targeted 
individual  ﬁ   nancial intermediaries, while the 
Eurosystem’s actions have been limited to 
liquidity extension. A further key difference has 
been the sizeable repayments of capital by US 
banks. This may be partly attributed to the fact 
that capital injection was a requirement in the 
United States, while, in the EU, capital support 
has typically been voluntary.
Within the EU, sizeable differences in crisis 
responses have emerged. These differences partly 
reﬂ  ect the magnitude of the problems faced by 
each banking system, the degree to which the 
banking systems are exposed to bad assets and, 
potentially, budgetary restrictions, which impose 
constraints on commitments. More speciﬁ  cally, 
a number of EU countries have set up schemes 
to address the problems in the ﬁ  nancial system, 
while many others have relied on ad hoc measures 
for individual institutions. Given the wide range 
of approaches in the EU, the United States 
naturally lies somewhere in between. A possible 
case in point is the widening of deposit insurance 
to USD 250,000 in the United States, which 
appears high by EU standards, but is dwarfed 
by the unlimited insurance granted by some EU 
countries.
Going forward, the crisis has raised considerable 
doubts as to the effectiveness of market discipline 
(see de Grauwe, 2008) and underlined the need 
for reform of regulation and supervision of the 
ﬁ  nancial  system. The reform process in both 
regions is ongoing. Efforts are being directed 
at improving the existing regulatory rules, 
designing new supervisory tools and enhancing 
the supervisory structure. With respect to the 
supervisory infrastructure, a key initiative in 
the EU is the proposal for the establishment of 
a European Systemic Risk Board, which will be 
an independent body responsible for conducting 
macro-prudential oversight of the EU’s ﬁ  nancial 
system as a whole and which will be supported 
analytically and logistically by the ECB. With 
respect to improving the regulatory rules, 
a reform package is currently being prepared by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as 
a cornerstone of the ﬁ  nancial regulatory reform. 
It aims at improving the quality, consistency 
and transparency of capital for credit institutions 
as well as developing a framework for liquidity 
risk. These proposals will improve the quality of 
capital, especially the so-called Tier-1 capital, 
which is of utmost importance for loss-absorption 
on a going concern basis. Furthermore, a non-
risk-based leverage ratio will be introduced as a 
supplementary measure to the Basel II risk control 
framework, with the objective to curb excessive 
These numbers exclude measures targeted at non-ﬁ  nancial  55 
institutions and measures taken by the Federal Reserve System, 
the ECB, the BoE and other national central banks.52
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balance sheet growth. In order to mitigate the 
inherent pro-cyclical nature of ﬁ  nancial activities, 
the Basel proposals also contain capital buffers 
and forward-looking provisioning. Finally, the 
proposals also include a global minimum liquidity 
risk requirements enabling credit institutions to 
withstand a short-term liquidity stress and ensure 
longer-term stability.
In addition, policy-makers must ﬁ  nd viable exit 
strategies from the support measures and 
address the particular issues raised by 
systemically important banks. The ﬁ  nancial 
crisis has demonstrated the need to subject 
systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions to 
regulatory and supervisory requirements, 
commensurate to the risks they pose to the 
ﬁ  nancial system and the real economy. One of 
the issues currently under debate is the 
introduction of additional prudential measures, 
for instance through capital surcharges or 
contingent capital instruments, liquidity 
surcharges, more intrusive supervision, and/or 
the introduction of bank levies. Finally, the 
events have underlined the need for an efﬁ  cient 
bank rescue mechanism. In particular, the crisis 
involving Fortis and Dexia (Box 4), the Icelandic 
bank failures, and Lehman Brothers highlight 
the need for further improvement of the cross-
border rescue framework.56
In Europe, several international fora have started to look into  56 
these issues (including the EC, the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors and the European Banking Committee).53
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THE SUPPORT MEASURES IN THE UNITED STATES
This appendix describes the measures taken by 
the Treasury, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve 
System in response to the current ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. With respect to the Fed, it describes 
the non-standard measures in support of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector. More speciﬁ  cally, the focus is 
on the numerous facilities set up in support of 
speciﬁ  c institutions and market segments.
DESCRIPTION OF MEASURES
The crisis response of the US Administration 
consists of four large building blocks: (i) The 
Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP); (ii) The FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity 
Guarantee Program; (iii) measures targeted at 
the Government Sponsored Entities, which are 
administered by the Treasury and the Fed; and 
(iv) the Fed’s unconventional measures. Table 4 
gives an overview of the various programs 
(including the committed and disbursed amounts), 
which are described in more detail below.
TARP/Financial Stability Program
The Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) 
was established under the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 3 October 2008 (EESA) with 
the speciﬁ  c goal of stabilizing the US ﬁ  nancial 
system and preventing a systemic collapse. 
TARP has a volume of USD 700 billion and is 
run by the Treasury’s new Ofﬁ  ce of Financial 
Stability. The measures taken under TARP 
encompass capital injections, loans and asset 
guarantees and target both the ﬁ  nancial  and 
non-ﬁ   nancial sector. Originally, the mandate 
of TARP was to purchase or insure “troubled” 
assets of ﬁ   nancial institutions. This mandate, 
however, has been ﬂ   exibly adjusted and 
extended as needs have arisen. The scope was 
ﬁ   rst extended in mid-October 2008 to allow 
for capital injections and in November 2008 
to allow for the support of the automobile 
industry. These amendments are reﬂ  ected in the 
establishment of several programs under TARP. 
Table 5 gives an overview of the objectives of 
the programs. Some of these programs have 
stringent rules for participation, a narrow 
choice of instruments and strict conditions 
(e.g. CPP and the Consumer and Business 
Lending Initiative Investment Program 
implemented under TALF). Others have been 
designed to provide the Treasury with a high 
degree of ﬂ  exibility (e.g. AGP, TIP and SSFI), 
which has been used to tailor their application 
to speciﬁ  c institutions. Under the umbrella of 
the Financial Stability Plan, the Treasury’s 
new extended crisis management strategy, 
some of the programs set up under TARP 
have been extended (e.g. the Consumer and 
Business Lending Initiative Investment Program 
implemented under TALF) and new programs 
have been set up (e.g. CAP and PPIP). Out of a 
total of USD 700 billion, USD 536 billion have 
so far been allocated to speciﬁ  c programs and 
USD 384 billion have already been used, which 
makes the take-up rate about 72%.57
FDIC measures
Starting on 14 October 2008, the Temporary 
Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) has tried 
to strengthen conﬁ  dence and encourage liquidity 
in the banking system by (i) guaranteeing newly 
issued senior unsecured debt of banks, thrifts, 
and certain holding companies (the Debt 
Guarantee Program), and by providing full 
coverage of non-interest bearing deposit 
transaction accounts, regardless of the dollar 
amount (the Transaction Account Guarantee 
Program (TAGP). Table 6 provides some details 
of these two programs. The FDIC has estimated 
that about USD 700 billion of deposits in 
non-interest bearing transaction accounts have 
been guaranteed which otherwise would not 
have been insured.58 Banks could choose to opt 
out of one or both of the programmes. With 
regard to the Debt Guarantee Program, the basis 
for the pricing of newly issued debt is linked to 
See http://www.ﬁ  nancialstability.gov/docs/May%202010%20 57 
105(a)%20Report_ﬁ  nal.pdf.
See http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/tlgp/index.html  58 
for more details.54
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the maturity of the debt.59 The amount of debt 
guaranteed by the FDIC is limited to 125% of 
the par or face value of senior unsecured debt 
outstanding as of 30 September 2008 per bank. 
For banks with no senior unsecured debt 
outstanding, a limit of 2% of total liabilities 
applies. Based on these limits, the FDIC 
estimated that the total amount of guaranteed 
debt that can be issued is about USD 609 billion. 
The debt guarantee program was extended by 
six months for senior unsecured debt issued 
after 1 April 2009 and before 31 October 2009 
and maturing before the end of 2012. However, 
a phasing out process has been initiated by 
raising the assessment fee in accordance with 
the time at which the debt was issued and the 
maturity date. In addition, non-insured 
depository institutions were charged a higher 
fee. On 20 October 2009 the FDIC established a 
limited, six-month emergency guarantee facility 
upon expiration of the Debt Guarantee Program. 
Under this emergency guarantee facility, 
ﬁ   nancial entities can apply to the FDIC for 
permission to issue FDIC-guaranteed debt 
during the period from 31 October 2009 to 
30 April 2010. The fee for issuing debt under 
the emergency facility will be at least 300 basis 
points, which the FDIC reserves the right to 
increase on a case-by-case basis, depending 
upon the risks presented by the issuing entity. 
Overall, about USD 305 billion of FDIC insured 
debt was outstanding as of 30 April 2010. With 
regard to the TAGP, the participation fee 
consists of a 10 basis point annual rate surcharge 
on non-interest-bearing transaction deposit 
amounts over USD 250,000. The TAGP was 
extended by a 12 month period until 
31 December 2010 with participation costs 
rising after the end of 2009. Riskier institutions 
will be subject to a higher fee for participating 
in the TAGP. Overall, the FDIC earned about 
USD 11.2 billion in fees and surcharges on both 
programmes with the debt guarantee programme 
contributing USD 10.4 billion.
Measures targeted at government sponsored 
entities
Speciﬁ  c measures in support of the government 
sponsored entities (i.e. Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, Ginnie Mae and the Federal Home Loan 
Bank) have been established by the Treasury 
and the Fed. As of June 2010, the overall amount 
used has been sizeable (USD 1,560 billion). The 
Treasury organised the support of the GSEs 
outside TARP, and thus the support needs to be 
added to the overall measures taken. The 
Treasury injected about USD 145 billion of 
capital in the GSEs and bought USD 150 billion 
of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) issued 
by these entities.60 The Fed also bought 
USD 1,096 billion of GSEs’ MBSs and a further 
USD 169 billion of agency debt.
Fed measures
The Federal Reserve System has adopted a 
range of non-standard measures in response to 
the current ﬁ  nancial crisis. These measures are 
reﬂ  ected in the establishment of several separate 
facilities that target speciﬁ  c ﬁ  nancial institutions 
or market segments. Table 7 provides the details 
of these measures. 
The bulk of the measures (in terms of volumes) 
target banks. The Term Auction Facility 
(TAF) was established to relieve pressures in 
short-term funding markets by auctioning term 
funds to depository institutions against full 
collateral. The TAF allows the Fed to inject term 
funds through a broader range of counterparties 
and against a broader range of collateral than 
open market operations. The gradual phasing 
out of TAF began through the reduction in the 
amount auctioned from USD 300 billion to 
USD 250 billion in July, to USD 200 billion 
in August, USD 150 billion in September and 
USD 125 billion in October, with a further 
reduction planned for November. The amount 
is split into two biweekly auctions for 28 and 
84 days. While the amount offered under the 
28-day auction remains USD 75 billion, the 
amount offered under the 84-day auction is 
reduced and the maturities will be reduced. 
The ﬁ  nal auction under TAF was conducted on 
Fees will be determined by the amount of FDIC-guaranteed debt,  59 
the maturity of the debt (expressed in years) and the annualized 
assessment rate, which increases with the maturity of the debt.
See Monthly Treasury Statement of Receipts and Outlays of the  60 
United States Government.55
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8 March 2010 and the credit extended under that 
auction matured on 8 April 2010. As a further 
facility, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Facility (TALF) was set up to help market 
participants meet the credit needs of households 
and small businesses by supporting the issuance 
of asset-backed securities (ABSs). The more 
general objective is to make credit available 
on more favourable terms by facilitating the 
issuance of ABSs and improving the market 
conditions for ABSs. Eligible securities are 
collateralised by various types of loans such as 
auto loans, student loans, credit card loans and 
commercial mortgage loans. Under TALF, the 
Fed will lend up to USD 200 billion to an SPV 
which buys up ABSs, granting the borrowers 
one and three-year loans and in exceptional 
cases loans for up to ﬁ  ve years.61 The SPV is 
partially funded through the US Treasury’s 
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), which 
will purchase USD 20 billion of subordinated 
debt in the SPV. TALF has been extended 
through 30 June 2010 for loans collateralized by 
newly issued CMBS and ceased making loans 
against all other types of TALF-eligible newly 
issued and legacy ABS on 31 March 2010.
The Fed has also supported some ﬁ  nancial 
institutions directly. The so-called Maiden Lane 
transactions comprise three separate limited 
liability companies (LLCs) which acquired 
assets from Bear Stearns and AIG.62 The Fed 
provided funding of USD 81.7 billion in the 
form of senior loans to the LLCs. The duration 
of the loans is 10 years for the Bear Stearns’ 
facility and 6 years for the two AIG facilities.63 
After the repayment of the loans, any remaining 
proceeds from ML-I are paid to the Fed and, in 
the cases of ML-II and ML-III, shared between 
the Fed and AIG. The transactions thus resemble 
a bad bank in which assets are transferred out of 
the institutions’ balance sheets. In addition, the 
Fed made a lending facility available to AIG in 
September 2008. The initial commitment under 
this facility was USD 85 billion secured by a 
pledge of AIG’s assets. The commitment under 
this facility was reduced to USD 60 billion in 
November as a result of a capital injection under 
TARP of USD 40 billion. In June 2009, AIG 
agreed with the Fed to swap USD 25 billion of 
debt for equity which cut the amount of AIG’s 
debt from USD 40 billion to USD 15 billion. 
More speciﬁ   cally, the transaction led to a 
reduction in the maximum amount available 
under the lending facility from USD 60 billion 
to USD 35 billion in December 2009. Subsequent 
sales of business units by AIG further reduced 
the ceiling of the credit facility to USD 34 billion 
as of May 2010. Finally, the Fed contributes to a 
ring-fencing agreement between Citigroup, the 
US Treasury, the FDIC and the Fed by 
committing to extend a non-recourse loan should 
the losses exceed a certain threshold.64
Another set of actions has the aim of 
supporting the mortgage market by the 
outright purchase of securities issued 
by government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) and mortgage-backed securities 
guaranteed by GSEs with a total volume 
of USD 169 billion and USD 1,096 billion, 
respectively, as of 28 April 2010, acquired 
via open market operations. These securities 
are held in the System Open Market Account 
(SOMA), which is managed by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.
Measures were also taken to restore liquidity in 
short-term debt markets. The Fed has created 
several facilities to restore liquidity in the money 
market. The Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility (CPFF) is a limited liability company 
(LLC) that provides a liquidity backstop to 
The amount originally committed under TALF was  61 
USD 200 billion. An increase of up to USD 1,000 billion was 
under discussion in May 2009, but was ultimately dropped.
The two Maiden Lane transactions involving AIG differ as  62 
regards the asset pools acquired. Maiden Lane II involved the 
purchase of residential mortgage-backed securities and Maiden 
Lane III multi-sector collateralised debt obligations.
The interest rate for the senior loan to Maiden Lane I (ML-I) is  63 
based on the Primary Credit Rate while, in the other two cases, 
the interest rate is the one-month LIBOR plus 100 basis points.
The loss-sharing arrangement is complex: Citigroup will  64 
cover the ﬁ   rst USD 39.5 billion losses on an asset pool of 
USD 301 billion, while the US Treasury will assume 90% of the 
second loss tranche up to USD 5 billion, the FDIC will assume 
90% of the third loss tranche up to USD 10 billion. Should even 
higher losses materialise, the Federal Reserve will extend a non-
recourse loan to cover the rest of the asset pool, with Citigroup 
being required to immediately repay 10% of such losses to the 
Federal Reserve.56
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US issuers of commercial paper and is intended 
to contribute to liquidity in the short-term paper 
market. The Money Market Investor Funding 
Facility (MMIFF) was speciﬁ  cally designed to 
restore liquidity in the money market and 
particularly the liquidity of money market 
funds.65 Under the facility, the Fed ﬁ  nances 90% 
of up to USD 600 billion of money market 
instruments with a remaining maturity of at least 
7 days and no more than 90 days. The funding is 
provided to ﬁ  ve special purpose vehicles (SPVs), 
established by the private sector, which will 
issue asset-backed commercial paper and 
borrow from the MMIFF. Both the CPFF and 
the MMIFF aim to increase the availability of 
credit for businesses and households through a 
revival of short-term debt markets. They differ 
in terms of the maturities of the assets funded, 
since the CPFF ﬁ  nances the purchase of three-
month commercial paper. Like the MMIFF, the 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) has the 
objective of facilitating the sale of assets by 
money market mutual funds in the secondary 
market to increase their liquidity.66 While the 
AMLF supports the funding of asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) with a maturity of up 
to 270 days issued by money market mutual 
funds, the MMIFF targets certiﬁ  cates of deposit, 
bank notes and commercial paper. The MMIFF 
has not been tapped so far, while the total value 
of collateral accepted under the AMLF amounted 
to USD 26 billion in June 2009.
The latest measures, introduced in March 2009, 
were two facilities in support of primary 
dealers: (i) the Term Securities Lending Facility 
(TSLF), an expansion of the Fed’s securities 
lending program, under which the Fed lends 
up to USD 200 billion of Treasury securities 
to primary dealers, secured for a month (rather 
than overnight, as in the existing program) 
by a pledge of other securities; and (ii) the 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), which 
provides overnight funding to primary dealers 
in exchange for a speciﬁ  ed range of collateral, 
thereby improving the ability of primary 
dealers to provide ﬁ  nancing to participants in 
securitisation markets. 
The facility became operational in November 2008 and will  65 
expire in November 2009.
The AMLF was established shortly after the default of Lehman  66 
Brothers on 19 September 2008 and will be in effect until 
February 2010.57
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Targeted at ﬁ  nancial sector
Treasury Capital Assistance 
Program (CAP) Largest banks
Capital 
injection
Treasury Capital Purchase 




Signiﬁ  cant Failing 
Institution Program 
(SSFI) AIG 70 1) 70 53
Capital 
injection
Treasury Targeted Investment 
Program (TIP) Citigroup, BOA 40 1) 00
Capital 
injection 23/12/2009 3.00
Treasury Asset Guarantee 
Program (AGP) Citigroup 5 0 0
2nd loss asset 
guarantee 23/12/2009 0.37
Treasury Consumer and 
Business Lending 
Initiative Investment 





(PPIP) 75-100 30 23
Bad bank 
model 0.07
Targeted at real sector
Treasury Making Home 
Affordable Program Households 50-75 40 30
Treasury Automotive Industry 
Financing Program GMAC,GM, 








receivables 4 0 0
Debt 
Obligation
Treasury Small Business and 
Community Lending 
Initiative Small Businesses 15 0 0
Securities 
purchase









Agreements Fannie Mae 200 85 65
Capital 
injection






Sum 400 297 227
FED
Targeted at ﬁ  nancial institutions
Fed Maiden Lane I Bear Steams 28.8 29 3) 22 Loan
Fed Maiden Lane II AIG 20 15 3) 12 Loan
Fed Maiden Lane III AIG 24.3 17 13 Loan
Fed AIG Credit Facility AIG 34 27 21 Credit line 1.82








Fed Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan 
Facility (TALF)
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Targeted at mortgage market












loan Bank 175 169 129
Asset 
purchase 31/03/2010 2.95
Targeted at short-term debt markets





and other ﬁ  nancial 
institutions 0 0 0
Asset 
purchase 30/10/2009















Targeted at primary dealers
Fed Term Securities 
Lending Facility 
(TSLF) Primary dealers 25 0 0 Asset swap 01/02/2010




of the FRBNY 0 0
Overnight 
collateralised 
loan facility 01/02/2010 0.036
Other
Fed Asset Guarantee 
Program (AGP) citigroup 220 0
Non-recourse 
loan 23/12/2009 0.05





Sum 2,477 1,408 1,074 46
FDIC (TLGP)
FDIC Debt Guarantee 
Program
Banks (max. 125% 
of senior unsecured 
debt outstanding) 569 305 233
Guarantee 
of new senior 
debt issues 30/04/2010 10.4
FDIC Transaction Account 
Guarantee Program Covers 
deposits above 






FDIC Asset Guarantee 
Program (AGP) Citigroup 10 0 0
3rd loss asset 
guarantee 23/12/2009
Sum 1,279 1,005 767 11.2
Overall sum 3,490 3,002 2,290
1) The commitment is equal to the usage, as this program is tailored to speciﬁ  c institutions.
2) The Treasury provides USD 20 billion of credit protection for loans extended by the Fed’s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
(TALF), which has a volume of up to USD 200 billion. This Table distributes the total usage of USD 41 billion between the Treasuy and 
the Fed accordingly.
3) Commitment includes accrued and capitalized interest. Usage presents.59
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Table 2 Treasury measures under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
Program Launch date Objective
Institutions involved 




14 Oct. 2008 To provide capital (in the form 
of senior preferred stock 
and subordinated debentures) to viable 
ﬁ  nancial institutions of all sizes.
31 Dec. 2009 1)
Targeted Investment 
Program (TIP)
To make investments in institutions 
that are critical to the functioning 
of the ﬁ  nancial system. Form, terms 
and conditions of any investment 
to be made on a case-by-case basis.
23 Dec. 2009 2)
Capital Assistance 
Program (CAP)
25 Feb. 2009 To restore conﬁ  dence throughout 
the ﬁ  nancial system that the largest 
banks have a sufﬁ  cient capital cushion 
against larger than expected future 
losses. Key component of CAP was 
the Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Program (SCAP). The Treasury 
will consider requests to exchange 
outstanding preferred shares sold under 
the CPP or TIP. Capital investments 
under the CAP will be placed in 
a separate entity, the Financial 
Stability Trust, set up to manage the 
government’s investments in US 
ﬁ  nancial institutions.
The Fed (through SCAP)
Systemically 
Signiﬁ  cant Failing 
Institution Program 
(SSFI)
To prevent disruptions to ﬁ  nancial 
markets from the failure of institutions 
that are critical to the functioning of the 
nation’s ﬁ  nancial system. The SSFI has 
been used to inject capital, in the form 




3 Oct. 2008 To guarantee certain assets held 
by the qualifying ﬁ  nancial institution 
and originated before March 14, 2008.




23 Mar. 2009 To buy legacy loans and securities 
from banks, thereby removing them 
from banks’ balance sheets and 
transferring them to a public-private 
partnership.
FDIC (legacy loans), 
the Fed (legacy 
securities, TALF)
Other programs




12 Nov. 2008 To support the consumer and business 
credit markets by providing ﬁ  nancing 
to private investors to help unfreeze 
and lower interest rates for auto, 
student loan, small business, credit 
card and other consumer and business 
credit. Joint initiative with the Federal 
Reserve System; builds upon, broadens 
and expands the resources of the Term 
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Table 2 Treasury measures under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (cont’d)
Program Launch date Objective
Institutions involved 
(other than Treasury) Closure date
Making Home 
Affordable Program
4 Mar. 2009 To offer assistance to as many as seven 
to nine million homeowners (through 
reﬁ  nancing and loan modiﬁ  cations).
Automotive Industry 
Financing Program
To prevent a signiﬁ  cant disruption 
of the American automotive industry, 
which poses a systemic risk to ﬁ  nancial 
market stability and would have 
a negative effect on the real economy. 
The form, terms and conditions 
of any investment to be made 
on a case-by-case basis.
Automotive Supplier 
Support Program
19 Mar. 2009 To provide suppliers with the 
conﬁ  dence they need to continue 
shipping their parts and the support 
they need to help access loans 
to pay their employees and continue 
their operations (through access
 to government-backed protection 
and the sale of their receivables into 
the program at a modest discount).
Notes: 1) Indicates deadline for application and 2) date of repayment.
Table 3 FDIC measures under the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
Program Launch date Objective
Institutions involved 
(other than FDIC) Closure date
Debt Guarantee 
Program
14 Oct. 2008 To guarantee newly issued senior unsecured debt 
of banks, thrifts and certain holding companies 
with a maturity of more than 30 days. Runs until 
31 October 2009, with guarantees not extending 




14 Oct. 2008 To provide full coverage of non-interest bearing 
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Table 4 The Fed’s non-standard measures
Program Launch date Objective
Institutions involved 
(other than the Fed) Date facility ends
Maiden Lane I 26 June 2008 To facilitate the merger of JPMC and Bear Stearns 
by providing senior loan to Maiden Lane to fund 
the purchase of a portfolio of mortgage-related 
securities, residential and commercial mortgage 







19 Sep. 2008 To extend non-recourse loans at the primary 
credit rate to US depository institutions and bank 
holding companies to ﬁ  nance their purchases 
of high-quality asset-backed commercial paper 





7 Oct. 2008 To provide liquidity to US issuers  of commercial 
paper through an SPV that will purchase 
three-month unsecured and asset-backed 
commercial paper directly from eligible issuers. 
The Fed provides ﬁ  nancing to the SPV, 
which is secured by the assets of the SPV 
and, in the case of commercial paper that is not 
asset-backed commercial paper,by the retention 
of upfront fees paid by the issuers or by other 
forms of security acceptable to the Fed in 





21 Oct. 2008 To support a private-sector initiative designed 
to provide liquidity to US money market 
investors by providing senior secured funding 
to a series of SPVs to ﬁ  nance the purchase of 
US dollar-denominated CDs and commercial 
paper issued by highly rated ﬁ  nancial 
institutions (DTC cleared, with remaining 
maturities of at least 7 days and at most 90 days) 
from eligible US money market mutual funds 
(and over time potentially also from other US 
money market investors). The Fed ﬁ  nances 
90% of up to USD 600 billion of assets bought 
by SPVs.
30 Oct. 2009
Maiden Lane III 25 Nov. 2008 To provide a loan to Maiden Lane III to fund 
the purchase of asset-backed collateralised debt 
obligations from certain counterparties 
of AIG Financial Products Corp. on which AIG 





25 Nov. 2008 To help market participants meet the credit 
needs of households and small businesses 
by supporting the issuance of asset-backed 
securities (ABSs) collateralised by student 
loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and 
loans guaranteed by the Small Business 
Administration (SBA). The Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (FRBNY) lends up 
to USD 200 billion on non-recourse basis 
to holders of certain AAA-rated ABSs backed 
by newly and recently originated consumer 
and small business loans. The FRBNY lends 
an amount equal to the market value of the 
ABSs less a haircut and is secured at all times 
by the ABSs. The Treasury under TARP 
provides USD 20 billion of credit protection 
to the FRBNY in connection with TALF.
Treasury 30 June 2010 and 
31 Mar. 2010 for 
loans collateralised 
by newly issued 
CMBS and for 
loans collateralised 
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Table 4 The Fed’s non-standard measures (cont’d)
Program Launch date Objective
Institutions involved 
(other than the Fed) Date facility ends
Maiden Lane II 12 Dec. 2008 To provide a loan to Maiden Lane II to fund 
the purchase of residential mortgage-backed 
securities from the securities lending portfolios 
of several US insurance subsidiaries of AIG.
Term Auction 
Facility (TAF)
12 Dec. 2008 To auction term funds of 28-day or 84-day 
maturity, depending on the auction, 
to depository institutions against full collateral. 
Loans for which the remaining term to maturity 
is more than 28 days are subject to additional 
collateral requirements. TAF allows the Fed 
to inject term funds through a broader range 
of counterparties and against a broader range 
of collateral than open market operations.
 Each TAF auction is for a ﬁ  xed amount, 
with the rate determined by the auction process 
(subject to a minimum bid rate).
8 Mar. 2010
Swap lines 
between the Fed, 
the ECB, and the 
SNB
12 Dec. 2008 To increase the existing swap lines to provide 
dollars in amounts of up to USD 30 billion 
and USD 6 billion to the ECB and the SNB, 
respectively, representing increases of 
USD 10 billion and USD 2 billion, respectively. 
The FOMC extended the term of these swap 




11 Mar. 2008 To lend up to USD 200 billion of Treasury 
securities to primary dealers, secured for a 
term of 28 days (rather than overnight, as in 
the existing program) by a pledge of other 
securities, including federal agency debt, federal 
agency residential-mortgage-backed securities 
(MBSs), and non-agency AAA/Aaa-rated 
private-label residential MBSs. The TSLF is 
intended to promote liquidity in the ﬁ  nancing 
markets for Treasury and other collateral 
and thus to foster the functioning of ﬁ  nancial 
markets more generally. As is the case with 
the “normal” securities lending program, 






16 Mar. 2008 To provide overnight funding to primary dealers 
in exchange for a speciﬁ  ed range of collateral, 
including all collateral eligible for tri-party 
repurchase agreements arranged by the FRBNY, 
as well as all investment-grade corporate 
securities, municipal securities, mortgage-backed 
securities and asset-backed securities for which 
a price is available. The PDCF is intended to 
improve the ability of primary dealers to provide 
ﬁ  nancing to participants in securitisation markets 








INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP ACROSS COUNTRIES
Table 5 Set-up and state of approval of national schemes
Country
Institution for funding 
guarantees
Institution for capital 
injections




Austria Special Entity (OeCAG) Special Entity (OIAG) n.a. Yes
Belgium Government Government n.a. Yes
Germany Special entity (SoFFin) Special entity (SoFFin) Special entity (SoFFin) Yes
Spain Government (Ministry of Finance) Special entity (FROB) Financial Asset Acquisition 
Fund (under Treasury)
Yes
Finland Special entity under State Treasury n.a. n.a. Yes
France Special entity (SFEF) Special entity (SPPE) n.a. Yes
Greece Government (Ministry of Finance) 
Collateral is administered 




Ireland Government Government Government (NAMA)  Yes
Italy Government (Ministry of Economy
and Finance)
Government Central Bank Yes
Luxembourg Government Government n.a. Yes
Netherlands Government Government ING Yes
Portugal Central Bank Government n.a. Yes
Denmark Danish Contingency Association Government Government
Switzerland n.a. Government Special entity under 
central bank
n.a.
United Kingdom Government Debt Management 
Ofﬁ  ce
Special entity (UKFI) BoE Yes
United States FDIC US Treasury (TARP) Treasury/FED n.a.
Sources: European Commission and national authorities.64
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This appendix describes the methodology 
employed when collecting the data for Table 1.
Data sources. Public data sources are used 
(e.g. websites of government and ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, Bloomberg for guaranteed bond 
issues, as well as newspaper articles). This 
information is reconciled with information that 
is being collected by the Fiscal Policies Division 
of the ECB’s Directorate General Economics 
and periodic follow-up cross-checking is also 
conducted with national authorities via the 
Working Group on Macro-prudential Analysis 
of the Banking Supervision Committee.
Cut-off date. Table 1 includes data on all support 
measures that have been taken by governments 
in response to the worsening of the crisis after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, speciﬁ  cally 
from 1 October 2008 onwards.
Classiﬁ  cation. Support measures are classiﬁ  ed 
according to three main categories: (i) guarantees 
for bank liabilities; (ii) recapitalisation measures; 
and (iii) measures to provide relief from legacy 
assets. Table 1 distinguishes between amounts 
that governments have committed themselves 
to provide (shown in brackets in the table) and 
amounts that have already been extended to 
ﬁ   nancial institutions. The committed amounts 
are based on government announcements, while 
the extended amounts are those amounts that 
have been agreed between the government and 
the recipient ﬁ   nancial institutions. Hence, the 
amounts that Table 1 shows as having been 
extended may not have actually been disbursed 
yet but can be expected to be disbursed. While 
our data sources do not allow us to distinguish 
between disbursed and announced amounts, 
for ﬁ  nancial stability purposes, it does indeed 
make sense to already include announced, but 
not yet disbursed amounts, as announcements 
are informal commitments and markets are 
likely to react to the announcements rather than 
to the actual disbursement. Table 1 also shows 
the amounts committed and extended under 
national schemes and outside such schemes. For 
instance, in Germany, all amounts committed 
and extended by SoFFin are shown as within 
schemes, while the amounts committed and 
extended by the state governments to their local 
Landesbanken are shown as outside schemes. 
For the United States, “within scheme” includes 
all amounts related to the TARP and support 
of government sponsored entities. The total 
commitment in terms of GDP sums up to the 
commitments across the three categories.
Exchange rates. For amounts committed or 
extended in currencies other that the euro, 
historic exchange rates from October 2008 are 
used. This means that items are included in 
Table 1 at the exchange rate that prevailed in 
October 2008. This convention was adopted to 
ensure that commitments and disbursements do 
not change over time as a result of exchange 
rate changes.65
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